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Payment for Ecosystems Services (PES) programs which are considered as incentivized 
mechanisms has been implemented in Latin America as a strategy to reduce deforestation by 
rewarding landowners (sellers) to protect forests and to provide ecosystem services to ecosystem 
users/beneficiaries (buyers).  
Two common management structures for PES programs have been implemented in Latin 
America: Government-financed and User-financed.  User-financed PES programs are promoted 
as being more environmentally effective and cost-effective compared with Government-financed 
programs.  Government-financed PES programs are perceived as less effective than User-financed 
PES due to the inclusion of equity as a critical policy outcome of PES.  
In this thesis, an analysis is conducted of the program structure of two PES programs in 
the program’s ability to support environmental effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness.  Two 
case studies were used in the analysis: the Costa Rica National PES Program, a Government-
financed program and the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA), 
a User-financed Program.  This thesis also investigates the role of the type PES program structure 
in the inclusion of equity in PES design and implementation.  
The analysis indicated that the Government-financed PES program was better structure to 
support higher indicators of environmental effectiveness, equity and cost-effectiveness.  The 
findings of the study showed that the program structure of PES is likely to influence whether equity 
is included in the design of the PES.  A Government-financed PES is more likely to include equity 






The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the program structure of two PES 
programs the Costa Rica National PES Program, a Government-financed program and the Los 
Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA), a User-financed Program, in 
the program’s ability to support environmental effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness.    This 
thesis also investigates the role of the type PES program structure in the inclusion of equity in PES 
design and implementation. 
 
1.1 Deforestation in Latin America 
Tropical forests “contain over half of the world's biodiversity” (UNEP-World Conservation 
Monitoring Center, 1992, 1). Over fifty-percent of those tropical forests are found in the neotropics 
(Butler 2012).  The neotropical ecozone "extends from central Mexico in the north to southern 
Brazil in the south, i.e., including Central America, the Caribbean islands and most of South 
America" (Antonelli and Sanmartín, 2011,1).  The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
constitutes 25% of the world's forests and possess the highest biodiversity value in the world 
(United Nations Environmental Program 2011, 4). 
The rich biodiversity of Latin America's tropical forests is continuously under threat of 
habitat and species loss and of species extinction due to unsustainable development.  Chief 
amongst the activities contributing to forest biodiversity loss is forest conversion for subsistence 
farming, large commercial-scale agricultural development and logging.   Between 1990 and 2005, 
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the total deforestation rate in Latin America and the Caribbean was estimated to be 69 million 
hectares (United Nations Environmental Programme, 2010, 1).   
In the context of this thesis, deforestation refers to the “complete long-term removal of tree 
cover” resulting from changes in land use (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998, 3).  It is undeniable 
that deforestation, specifically tropical deforestation, is not simply a localized issue, but extends 
beyond the borders of impacted countries.  Tropical deforestation is a global concern due to the 
projected future acceleration of habitat and species loss, human and infrastructure loss from natural 
disasters, the increase of atmospheric carbon emissions driving climate change and the overall 
domino effect of these changes on trade and economy, health, and regional and global security.  
Tropical forest loss has a significant impact on global climate.  Through the photosynthesis 
process, tropical forests absorb 1.4 billion tons of the 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
absorbed by carbon sinks (Schimel, Stephens and Fisher, 2014, 440).   The tropical forests in Latin 
America account for 84.2% of above-ground carbon stock.  However, the reverse occurs in 
deforestation as tropical forests become CO2 emitters contributing 3.7 billion tons of CO2 into the 
atmosphere (Baccini, Goetz, Walker et al., 2012, 4).   According to a 2007 report by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), deforestation in Latin America and the Caribbean "was 
estimated to be responsible for 48.3% of global CO2 emissions". 
 
Chomitz et. al (2007) predict that the rate of tropical forest loss at 5 percent a decade will 
be responsible for the addition of 3 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere each year, 
causing many harmful consequences: “intensifying climate change; loss not just of many 
species, but also entire ecosystems; and across the tropics, widespread changes in water 
flows, scenery, microclimates, pests, and pollinators” (Chomitz, 2007, 1). 
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The developing countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are in a quagmire between 
the drive for economic development and addressing poverty, while at the same time protecting 
critical tropical forests and their rich biodiversity.  Significant efforts are being made at the 
national, regional and global levels to develop and implement strategies to reduce forest 
degradation and deforestation in order to address climate change.  
The command-and-control approach has been the primary public policy option for 
addressing environmental problems in Latin America and the Caribbean.1 However, 
implementation of the command and control approach to addressing deforestation and forest cover 
and biodiversity loss has not been effective (Bulte, Lipper, Stringer, and Zilberman 2008). As a 
stand-alone strategy to natural resources management, this approach “often results in unforeseen 
and undesirable consequences” (Holling and Meefe, 1996, 329). 
Causes and drivers of deforestation are heterogeneous with complex interplays between 
motivations and behaviors; this causal complexity makes command and control approach not as 
effective.  Geist and Lambin (2002) theorize that “multiple factors, rather than single-factor 
causation” drive deforestation citing “economic, institutional, technological, cultural and 
demographic outcomes with identifiable regional patterns of causal factor synergies” (Geist and 
Lambien, 2002, 1).   A mix of policy options, including incentive-based mechanisms such as 
payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs, have been implemented in an effort to support 
the continued provision of ecosystem services, including those services provided by forests. 
 
                                                 
1  Command and control approaches to natural resources management, including forest management, use non-voluntary laws and 
regulations to control changes to natural resources through setting standards, fines, etc.   Command and control regulatory 
approaches are in contrast to approaches that influence behavior by supporting voluntary participation, such as through the use of 
incentives. 
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1.2 Ecosystem Services 
 
Ecosystem services are defined as the benefits people derive from ecosystems – the support 
of sustainable human well-being that ecosystems provide (Constanza, d’Arge, de Groot, Farber, et 
al. 1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) 2005)2.   
There is a diversity of models for ecosystem services.  This thesis will use the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment’s model, which groups the services into supporting, provisioning, 
regulating and cultural.  Using the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystem Services model 
provides the best fit for the ecosystem services which are currently being incentivized based on 
demand in payment for ecosystem services programs (Mayrand and Paquin 2004). 
    Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines ecosystems as a 
“dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living 
environment interacting as a functional unit.”  In 2005, the United Nations concluded a five-year 
                                                 
2     Ecosystem services is also referred to as environmental services in some literature.  The differences between the two terms is 
defined in differing ways.   One definition identifying the differences refers to ecosystems services as being the natural environment 
while environmental services refers to both the natural and built environment (Bulte, 2008, 2410.  Another definition is that 
environmental services refers to specific, defined services while ecosystem services refers to systemic, synergies of services 
(Wunder, 2008, 2). 
Figure 1: a) Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystems. (b) Ecosystem services being sold/on demand from payment 
for ecosystem services.  Model shows the ecosystems services provided under payment for ecosystem services schemes 
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global ecosystem assessment - the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA).  One of the key 
objectives of the assessment was to study the links between ecosystems and human well-being and 
identify the impacts that changes to ecosystems have on the well-being of humans (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).  Findings of the study found that 60-70% of the global ecosystems 
evaluated were being “degraded or being used unsustainably” with potentially dire consequences 
for the world’s poor particularly in terms of the provision of freshwater and arable lands 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report 2005, 20). 
1.3 Incentivizing Forest Protection and the Management of Ecosystem Services 
 
Conservation strategies, specifically protected areas, have been implemented throughout 
Latin America as a key strategy for reducing deforestation rates and biodiversity loss.  The results 
have been mixed in reducing forest cover and biodiversity loss. To strengthen the support of the 
public in avoiding deforestation strategies, incentivized strategies, including payment for 
ecosystem services program have become the frontline public policy tool.   Due to the relation 
between deforestation and poverty, further pressures to implement sound strategies are being 
promoted by global agendas such as the Millennium Development Goals.  Scaling up of PES has 
occurred in the establishment of REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries) which occurs at the country level (Pagiola 2011). 
Constanza (1997) valued ecosystem services, estimated at between “$16 – 54 trillion with 
the average being no less than $33 trillion, higher than the entire world gross national product”.  A 
2011 reassessment valued ecosystem services at an estimated US$125 trillion/year.  Valuation of 
ecosystem services is seen as critical to drive decision making and public policy development in 
the management of ecosystem services (Constanza 1997).   Further validation for valuation is made 
in the context of incentivized initiatives such as payment for ecosystem services.  It is argued that 
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for these initiatives to be effective, the value of the ecosystems services must be properly accounted 
for.   
Valuation of ecosystem services and incentivizing their management through payment for 
environmental services is not without criticism as literature presents another perspective of 
valuation as the commodification of ecosystem services (Huberman 2008; McCauley 2006; Kosoy 
and Corbera 2010).  The opposition to valuation and payment for ecosystem services raises 
concerns of “property rights over ecosystem services” and failure to account for intrinsic or non-
use value (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010, 1234).   
Constanza et al. (2014) and Farley and Constanza (2010) disagree with the position that 
valuation equals commodification, positing that ecosystem services are public goods or common 
pool resources that do not fit the privatization or conventional market model and that valuation 
allows greater understanding of the importance of ecosystem services.  As public goods, ecosystem 
services are non-rival and non-excludable meaning they can be consumed without affecting the 
opportunity for others to consume those same goods and services (Farley and Constanza 2010).  
Ecosystem services are also considered as common pool resources (rival but non-excludable) 
(Farley and Constanza 2010).  Rival but non-excludable refers to ecosystem services that are not 
infinite but are not closed off from any groups to use (Farley and Constanza 2010).  Significant 
implications for PES arise over differentiation in the category in which ecosystems services fits.  
Club resources are more likely to be managed by a private entity or within a User-managed PES 
program (Dunn 2011).   
There is an exception to ecosystem services being public goods and common pool 
resources. Some ecosystem services, such as watersheds, fall into a third category referred to as 
“club resources”.  Club resources are rival and excludable, therefore, ecosystems services which 
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are club goods can be used amongst many people but there is not a deleterious effect on distribution 
to others (Dunn 2011).  However, as in a “club” with members, “non-members can be prevented 
from using the services” (Dunn, 2011, 26).   
Another concern raised overvaluation and creating market-based incentives as payment for 
ecosystem services is the potential for the increase in issues of inequity in accessing resources and 
further marginalization of the poor and indigenous people (Greig-Gran and Porras 2005).  Further 
implications for poor communities may arise in a User-financed program should equity/fairness 
not be a high consideration in PES design 
The issue of equity in payment for ecosystem services is explored further in this thesis as 
a critical component of payment for ecosystem services design.  
This thesis will contribute to research on payment for ecosystem services by analyzing the 
effect of PES program structure on achieving environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness and 
equity as outcomes of the program.  The analysis will be conducted in the context of a Government-
financed PES and a User-financed PES program. In addition, I hope to contribute to a new line of 
enquiry in evaluating whether the program structure of a PES determines the inclusion of equity 






A purposive sample approach (Randolph, 2009, p. 4) was undertaken to conduct the 
literature review.  The literature review is divided into two sections: (1) Payments for ecosystem 
services as a conservation tool, and (2) existing work in evaluating program structures for payment 
for ecosystem services with focus on research on decentralized or User-financed PES programs 
and Government-financed PES programs and (3) the inclusion of equity in the policy outcomes of 
PES.   
2.0 Defining Payment for Ecosystem Services 
 
 Pagiola (2004) describes payments for ecosystem services “as a method of internalizing 
the positive externalities associated with a given ecosystem or a specific resource use”3.  
Externalities are “the costs and benefits which arise when the social or economic activities of one 
group of people have an impact on another, and when the first group fails to fully account for their 
impact” (Europe Commission, 1995). Using a hypothetical scenario of Farmer A and B: Farmer A 
clears riparian forest upstream which results in increased sedimentation and turbidity in the source 
of drinking water for a downstream community.  This would be considered to be a cost or a 
negative externality.  In contrast, Farmer B decides to maintain a riparian buffer in a watershed 
which increases the water quality for the downstream community.  Farmer B’s actions are 
considered as a benefit or a positive externality.  Payment for ecosystem services targets the 
                                                 
3      An effect is internalised if the loss of welfare is accompanied by a compensation equal to the damage cost by the agent causing the externality.  
European Commission, DG Environment (2000).  A Study on the Economic Valuation of Environmental Externalities from Landfill Disposal and 
Incineration of Waste Final Main Report. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/studies/pdf/econ_eva_landfill_report.pdf 
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development of a positive externality through the “provision of ecosystem services” (Pascual, 
Muradian, Rodríguez and Duraiappah, 2009, 3).  The underlying concept for PES is that without 
incentivizing the participation of landowners to change existing or potential land use behavior that 
is degrading or damaging critical forests and their provision ecosystem services, a high risk exists 












                     
PES is one of the tools being used to correct the “failure of markets to value biodiversity 
and ecosystems” (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, 2010, 15).  The concept of PES 
is that the traditional markets do not account for ecosystem services.  Indeed, the PES model is 
indicative of the shift in the attitude and decision making towards nature in general, and the 
benefits of ecosystem services in particular, as being a public good with no quantifiable value 
(Costanza, et. al. 1997).   
Figure 2:  The logic of payment for ecosystems services.  Source: Stefano Pagiola and Gunars 
Platais, 2005 
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PES is categorized as a market-based approach whereby a value is placed on the benefits 
of ecosystem services (in terms of payments made to provider), similar to any product being placed 
on the market, and then charging end Users4.  The common ecosystem services (Chomitz, Brenes 
and Constantino 1998,Wunder 2008) included within payment for environmental programs are:  
1. watershed protection 
2. biodiversity protection 
3. carbon sequestration and, 
4. preservation of intrinsic values, e.g. scenic/landscape beauty 
  Ecosystem services may be sold as a “bundled” of services in a payment program (Wunder, 
2005, 2) whereby an enrolled area of land is considered to be delivering several ecosystem services 
(Mayrand and Pacquin 2004).  “Bundling” is considered to be more efficient as the transactions 
costs are reduced.  Contrastingly, “bundling” is considered less effective in meeting environmental 
targets compared with payments for individual services (Mayrand and Pacquin, 2004, 15). 
2.1 The Economic Nature of Payment for ecosystem services 
 
There is no single universally accepted definition of payment for ecosystem services.  
However, the definition of PES by Wunder (2005) is widely referenced in literature (Forest Trends, 
the Katoomba Group and UNEP 2008).  The definition of PES by Wunder (2005) defines PES as: 
1. a voluntary transaction where 
2. a well-defined environmental service (or a land-use likely to secure that service)  
3. is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer  
                                                 
4      Payment for ecosystem services is commonly defined as a market based mechanism.  However, that categorization has drawn 
criticism that PES does not fit the scope of a market based mechanism and some literature differentiates between PES and MES 
(markets for ecosystem services). Vatn, A.  An Institutional Analysis of Payments for ecosystem services. Ecological Economics 69 
(2010) 1245-1252. 
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4. from a (minimum one) service provider  
5. if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality). 
 The theoretical basis for Wunder’s five criteria and (generally speaking) the payment for 
ecosystem services framework, is the Coasean theorem.  Coasean theorem states that paredo 
efficient (market efficiency) can be achieved where private individuals voluntarily reach an 
agreement to address an externality.  However, an agreement that internalizes the externality can 
only be reached where property rights are clearly defined, there is an enforceable contract and the 
agreed transaction/negotiation are low.  Government’s intervention is only required to define 
property rights.   
However, the Coasean approach to PES is challenged as not being realistic to local realities.  
Further criticisms have arisen citing the definition produced by Wunder (2005) as being more a 
“theoretical reference point” (Vatn, 2010, 147) and that the “often perceived” Coasean approach 
to PES is not reflected in the literature analyzing existing PES structures (Lapeyre and Picard, 
2013, 10).   
Farley and Costanza (2010) asserts that the foundation of Wunder (2005) definition - the 
Coasean theorem - does not apply to all PES programs and emphasizes that “ecological 
sustainability takes precedence over market efficiency.”  The aforementioned position is supported 
by Lapeyre and Picard (2013) observing that a review of the literature on PES shows that PES 
arrangements “lean towards regulatory price changes e.g. subsidies” to effect change in land use 
by landowners.  Case in point, the Costa Rica National PES program is partially funded by fuel 
and water taxes (Blackman and Woodward 2010).  Financial input into the payments for ecosystem 
services in Mexico is an earmarked US$18 million from water taxes towards PES and the World 
Bank and Global Environment Facility have invested US$8 million in a regional integrated 
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silvopastoral program between Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Colombia (World Bank 2008).  Non-
voluntary contributions to PES for public goods may be necessary to prevent free riding (Jack, 
Kousky and Sims 2007) 
Vatn (2010) suggests that PES programs on the ground are a “mixed between Coase and 
Pigou.” Ironically, the development of payment for ecosystem services was considered a shift from 
the Pigouvian theorem which prescribed subsidies or taxes to achieve positive externalities 
(Pattanayak, Wunder and Ferrano 2010).  
Emerging from the discourse which describes PES as a mix of voluntary and non-voluntary 
buyers, is an attempt to reshape the concept of PES.   Muradian et al (2010) define payment for 
ecosystem services as “a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create 
incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the 
management of natural resources.” 
It is highly relevant to discuss existing and emerging definitions of PES as the adoption of 
one definition over the other guides the analyses/evaluation of PES programs.   Subscribers to the 
Coasean approach to PES are likely to determine that user-managed/private programs are more 
effective and efficient than Government-managed/public sector programs5 (Wunder, Engel, 
Pagiola 2008).  In addition, the Coasean approach to PES supporters are less likely to view equity 
as a critical part of the PES and more as a corruption of the efficiency of PES or as a “side 
objective” (Wunder, 2008, 2; Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, 2008, 9).  As Pascual, Muradian, 
Rodríguez and Duraiappah (2009) point out “Coasean policy approaches tend to disregard equity 
                                                 
5      The Coasean approach advocates for limited Government involvement and lower transactions costs. Literature reviewed 
showed that in Government versus User managed program, the Government managed programs had higher transaction costs 
particularly due to the number of participants.  Wunder, S, Engel, S and Pagiola, S.  Taking Stock: A comparative analysis of 
payments for ecosystem services programs in developed and developing countries (2008). 
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issues since they are based on the premise that efficiency gains may be independent of the 
allocation of property rights.” 
Subscribers to a mixed approach to PES along the lines of the Muradian et al (2010) re-
definition, give consideration to equity (poverty alleviation, protection of rights, etc.) into the 
design of PES (Vatn 2010) and of equal value as effectiveness and efficiency in measuring PES 
(Porras, Barton, Chacon-Cascante and Miranda 2013). 
2.2 PES Framework 
 
A PES program includes buyers/users, who are charged for the benefits that they derived 
from environmental service; service sellers/providers who are compensated/rewarded/incentivized 
for protecting forests which provide those ecosystem services (Wunder 2005) and intermediaries 
brokering the payment program.  Commonly in Government-financed PES programs, the buyers 
are dispersed amongst a general population and financing for PES is indirect e.g. through water 
tax.  In contrast, in user-financed programs, the buyer is a direct beneficiary and financing for PES 
is direct. 
The other critical actor is the seller. PES’ fundamental theory is that without 
compensation/reward/incentivizing of targeted landholders to adopt better land use practices, the 
provision of the ecosystem services would be compromised.   Property rights are one of the key 
components of payment for ecosystem services.  For a seller to be considered for inclusion in a 
payment for ecosystem services program, the seller must have rights over the area to be contracted.  
There has been an evolution of sorts in defining property rights from the requirement of strict land 
title to the recognition of variations of land tenure (Lea and Mahanty 2009).  Communal land 
rights, which is the traditional method of land management amongst indigenous people, have also 
been recognized for inclusion into PES programs as well as collective holding (Vatn 2010).  The 
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requirement for property rights or land ownership in PES programs has raised concerns over 
whether PES supports inequity by blocking poor farmers from entering into PES agreements or 
cause the displacement of poor farmers due to land grab by richer, larger scale farmers (Vatn 2010).    
Intermediaries are the third actors in PES programs.  Their role may include acting as the 
go-between the buyer and seller and function in a range of positions including as negotiator, 
contractor, and administrator of the PES program (Huber-Stearns 2012).  In national PES programs 
such as in Costa Rica and Mexico, the Government often acts as the intermediary.  However, even 
in these programs, there are other smaller intermediaries which may act on the collective behalf of 
sellers (Chomitz, Brenes and Constantino 1998). 
 
 
Figure 3: The Flow of Compensation from Beneficiaries to Land Users in Payment for Environmental 
Services.  Source:  Pagiola, S. and Platais, G. Environmental Strategy No. 2. The World Bank 2002. 
 The financing mechanism for payment for ecosystem services is used to collect and manage the 
funds contributed into the program by the buyers/beneficiaries (Mayrand and Pacquin, 2004).  
Financing sources vary amongst programs and may include: direct payment from beneficiaries and 




Markets for Ecosystem Services 
 In developing countries, the concept of the market is localized without services being sold 
outside national boundaries.  The exception is carbon sequestration.  Carbon sequestration is traded 
as carbon credits through the international carbon market which is supported by the Kyoto Protocol 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Arriagada and Perrings 2014).   
2.3 Costs, Permanence, Leakage, Additionality 
 
There are four major evaluative factors for payment for ecosystem services programs 
efficiency and effectiveness: costs, additionality, leakage, and permanence.  Costs in a PES 
program includes (1) opportunity costs and (2) transaction costs. 
Opportunity costs refer to the projected costs of a landowner forgoing economic activities 
e.g. agriculture, cattle raising for activities such as afforestation, shade agriculture or no action 
which protect the provision of ecosystem services.  Transactions/implementation costs addresses 
expenses that include negotiations, contract development, conducting baseline studies, monitoring 
and enforcement and capacity building (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2007).   
Measuring the effectiveness of a PES program requires the establishment of an accurate 
baseline.  The baseline is critical to determining what provision of ecosystem services have 
occurred since the implementation of the PES, this baseline is called the counterfactual.   A 
payment for ecosystem services should produce changes in land use supporting the provision of 
ecosystems services – which is called additionality.  The determination of additionality means that 
without the implementation of PES, the land use change would not have occurred. 
Leakage occurs outside the contract areas of a PES program and is directly linked to the 
implementation of PES.  Degradation and damaging activities to ecosystems within the PES 
contract area spills over to adjacent areas.  Payments for ecosystem services are generally 
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structured on a five-year participation period for participants.  After this period, the goal is that the 
landowners would continue with the provision of ecosystem services in the long-term (Wunder, 
Engel and Pagiola 2008).  When the long-term provision of ecosystem services is achieved, 
permanence of the PES is indicated. 
2.4 The Issue of Equity in PES Programs 
 
Land rights and access to resources create power asymmetries, changing the power 
structure by placing decision-making powers in the hands of those with resource rights (Kuponiyi 
2008).  Resource rights and access determines “allocation, costs and benefit sharing” (United 
Nations Environment Programme,2012,8) and can create unequal access and asymmetric power 
relations (Vatn 2010).  The potential for marginalization and increasing inequities is ever present 
in natural resources management (Quesada-Aguilar and Franks 2014).  Often times it is the poor 
or marginalized that bear the most costs and are displaced as they are the most resource dependent 
for subsistence use as well as economic livelihood.  
Equity in payment for ecosystem services is commonly perceived as morally and politically 
significant, but negatively impacting the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of 
PES (Pascual, Phelps, Garmendia et al. 2014).  The early developmental phase of payment for 
ecosystem services, equity and legitimacy were not part of the discussion (Corbera and Adger 
2007) and the focus was solely on environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency.   Adger, 
Brown, Fairbrass et al. (2003) states that in sound environmental decision-making, equal attention 
must be paid to “efficiency, effectiveness, equity and legitimacy” as critical outcomes in project 
design.  Equity as a critical outcome in PES design is gaining traction, however, the debate rages 
on whether or not the inclusion of equity considerations lessens the program’s effectiveness and 
efficiency, and if the trade-offs are worth it. 
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How is equity defined and is it important for PES to work?  There is no single definition 
for equity as the perception of equity is not consistent across social groups (Quesada-Aguilar and 
Franks 2014), but equity frameworks commonly refer to four dimensions of equity and principles 
(McDermot, Mahanty and Schreckenberg 2012, Quesada-Aguilar and Franks 2014, Pascual, 
Phelps, Garmendia et al 2014).  The four dimensions of equity are (1) procedure, (2) distribution, 
(3) recognition and (4) context.   Figure 5 shows the principles for each dimension.  
 The inclusion of equity dimensions as an equal weight with environmental effectiveness 
and costs effectiveness can result in positive results including stronger legitimacy, improvement 
in compliance and participation (Pascual, Phelps, et al. 2014).  Beyond the potential for equity 
actions in PES to support cost effectiveness, there is a moral obligation to protect the basic needs 
of all people, including the poor and marginalized.  
In the inception of PES as a conservation tool, the exclusion of equity was contrary to the 
theoretical understanding of the program’s purpose in totality (Corbera and Adger 2007).  Payment 
for Ecosystem Services was envisaged as a conservation strategy that would not only be “more 
Figure 4: The three dimensions of social equity with context 
encompassing all three.  Source: Pascual, Phelps, 
Garmendia et al. 2014 
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economically efficient and environmentally effective than previous strategies”, but it was 
anticipated that PES’ that economic and social benefits would be fairly distributed (Corbera and 
Adger,2007, 1).  According to Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), because payment for ecosystem 
services target is biodiversity conservation, the expectation is that the outcome would be positive 
both environmentally and economically.  Further assumption made is that the marginalized would 
benefit.  These assumptions have created a vacuum in the PES literature on “the issue of 
distribution” (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002, 61).  Rather than discussing distributional 
outcomes, the focus was on aggregate outcomes with the aim to “do no harm” to the poor. 
  The following section of this thesis expands the discussion on the varied positions on the 
trade-off between economic efficiency and equity is broadened.   
 
2.5 Trading Equity for Efficiency 
 
Payment for ecosystem services programs are implemented using varied 
institutional/program models (Appendix A), however, they share similar design elements which 
allow for analysis of models.  This thesis’ area of interest is the analysis of the program structure 
of a Government -financed and User-financed program’s in their ability to deliver environmental 
effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and equity. 
 
2.5.1 Existing Research 
The literature on PES rarely, until the most recent works, rarely integrated the three critical 
policy outcomes of PES: environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity (Jack, Kousky 
and Sims 2007).  Historically, the general focus has been on environmental effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness as direct policy outcomes. Research based on the Coasean approach to PES 
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invariably approaches equity as a side objective that negatively affects the cost-effectiveness and 
environmental effectiveness of the PES program (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008, Engel, Pagiola 
and Wunder 2008, Wunder and Alban 2008, Pattanayak, Wunder and Ferraro 2010).  Wunder 
(2013) expounds on this theory and aligns equity as a side objective in Government-financed PES 
programs, asserting that User-financed PES programs are better able to be effective in meeting the 
PES goal.  Government financed PES programs are determined to be “politically adrift into win-
win spheres of multiple side-objectives, such as poverty alleviation, regional development, or 
electoral motives” (Wunder, 2013, 45). 
There is a small, but growing discussion, on equity as critical to PES success (Leimona, 
Joshi and van Noordwijk 2007) in line with “Muradian” refocusing of PES.   Pascual, Muradian, 
Rodriguez and Duraiappah (2009) advances the argument beyond the inclusion of equity, to the 
interdependency of cost effectiveness, and equity and its effect on PES (Martin, Gross-Camp, 
Kebede and McGuire 2014, Pascual, Muradian, Rodriguez and Duraiappah 2009).  The theory 
underpinning the link is that perceived inequities in PES programs may lead to inefficiency that 
“undermine cooperative behavior and foster conflictive behavior” (Martin, Gross-Camp, Kebede 
and McGuire, 2014, 224;Fripp, 2014, 24).    
Wunder, Engel and Pagiola (2008) have produced the most significant body of work in the 
analysis of PES design focus on the management structure, i.e., Government-financed versus User- 
financed.  The comparative analysis is based on the “synthesis” of 12 case studies of PES in 
developed and developing countries (Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, 2008, 3).   
Case studies reviewed include Wunder and Alban (2008) which examined two User-
managed PES programs in Ecuador the Pimampiro program - watershed protection and the 
PROFAFOR program - carbon sequestration. The findings of the case study of the two User-
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managed programs indicated successful outcomes in achieving the “environmental objectives” 
including additionality, negligible leakage and meeting conditionality (Wunder and Alban, 2008, 
696).   Equity/fairness including poverty alleviation and other pro-poor initiatives are presented as 
“side objectives” (Wunder and Alban, 2008, 696).   
The findings of the comparative analysis as it relates to equity/fairness follows the criticism 
that the Coasean approach looks at aggregate net gain and loss and not distributional outcomes 
(Pascual, Muradian, Rodriguez and Duraiappah 2009).   
 
2.6 Limitations and Research Questions 
 
The existing theory is that a User-financed PES program is better programmatically 
structured to be effective in meeting the PES goals than a Government-financed program.  
However, the existing theory is based largely on research which is limited to analyzing only 
effectiveness and efficiency outcomes without equal and comprehensive consideration given to 
equity.  The argument put forward to not include equity consideration in the design of a PES 
program is that this can lead to a distortion or introduction of “side objectives” in the purpose of 
the PES (Wunder, 2008, 2; Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, 2008, 90).  There has been growing 
research focusing on the inclusion of equity in the design of PES including linking equity and 
efficiency as interdependent outcomes, the impact of PES program on poor communities and 
landowners and measuring the distributional outcomes of PES6.   
The purpose of this thesis is to use two case studies to investigate whether the program 
structure of a PES program determines its environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and 
                                                 
6      Equity/fairness is often referred to as pro-poor, poverty alleviation, poverty reduction and equal participation. 
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equity, and whether or not a PES program can be environmentally effective and cost effective and 
still be equitable.  
Thus, the following inquiry will be made.    
1. How does the program structure of a user-financed PES program differ from a 
Government-financed program in cost effectiveness, environmentally effectiveness, and 
equity? 
2. Does the program structure or institutional design of payment for ecosystem services 








The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the program structure of a user-financed and a 
Government-financed PES program in achieving environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, 
and equity.  The case study design is used in this qualitative research.  A case study is: 
an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon, set within its real-world 
context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin, 2014, 16).   
Further, a qualitative case study design was used to present the research.  A qualitative case 
study is defined as “an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon such 
as a program, an institution, a person, a group or policy” (Merriam,1998, xii).  
The qualitative case study design was the most appropriate research design as the study 
was done on the phenomenon in its natural setting without any intervention.  Secondly, the 
qualitative case study method allowed for the collection of data from “multiple sources of 
evidence” (Yin, 2009,117), allowing for triangulation of data collected as well as reducing biases 
from informants, authors and myself as the researcher (Yin 2009).   Thirdly, qualitative research 
advances the collection of descriptive data wherein the thesis focus area requires a detailed 
description to thoroughly understand the components of the cases being studied.  Lastly, the 
qualitative case study design is appropriate as the cases being investigated through the case study 
design are “well-bounded and specific”, i.e. there are clear limits to the cases being studied and 
the data being collected (Stake, 2005, 443; Merriam,1998,27).   
Using a multiple-case design, two contrasting cases: Costa Rica National Program, a 
Government-financed for PES program and Los Negros Valley, Bolivia’s User-financed PES 
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program are investigated.  The multiple case design allows for studying the phenomenon using 
more than one case, fitting the scope of this thesis which focuses on two distinct program structure 
types implementing PES programs. One of the key advantages to using multiple cases versus using 
a single case study is that multiple case study allows for supporting the claim of “literal or 
theoretical replication” (Rowley,2002,21; Yin, 2009, 54).  A literal replication refers to the 
“prediction of similar results” (Rowley,2002,21; Yin, 2009, 54) and a theoretical replication 
indicates “the prediction of contrasting results” (Rowley, 2002, 21; Yin, 2009, 54) with expected 
reasons for the differences.  
 Stake (1995) indicates that the pursuit of research through case study are underpinned by 
different end goals for researchers.  Similarly, to Yin (2009), Stake (1995) notes the use of a 
multiple cases in research which he refers to as collective case study.  A collective case study may 
include cases that are “similar or dissimilar” (Stake,1995,237). Further, the collective/multiple 
case study defined as being instrumental as it provides for an in-depth understanding of “an issue 
or refinement of a theory” (Stake, 1995, 237).   The cases being studied are both similar in that 
they are PES programs and dissimilar as the buyers of the ecosystem services are not the Users in 
the Government-financed program, contrasting with that of the User-finance structure. 
The case study design has been criticized for being weak in the ability to establish external 
validity (Falk and Guenther 2006).   As Yin (2003) indicates, conducting a multiple case study is 
advantageous as it increases the external validity or generalization of the research.  A caveat, 
however, is that multiple case studies do not create statistical generalization, i.e., generalization to 
the whole population, rather, case studies produce analytical generalization which is a 
generalization of existing, expanding and generating theories (Yin 2009).  
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3.0 Case Study 
 
Two case studies were purposively selected for the research (Patton, 1990, 169) based on 
their program structure: (1) Government-financed PES - Costa Rica’s National PES, and (2) User-
financed PES – Bolivia.  Purposeful sampling lends to the inclusion of cases that will provide 
comprehensive information on the phenomenon being studied.  Various sampling strategies can 
be employed in purposeful sampling.   The strategy implemented for Costa Rica’s PES program 
is a typical case sampling providing an “illustrative sample” (Patton, 1990, 173).    In the selection 
of the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia’s PES program, intensity sampling was used (Patton, 1990, 
171).  In intensity sampling, the cases are “excellent or rich examples of the phenomenon of 
interest” (Patton, 1990, 171). 
The selection of the cases was based on (1) location (Latin America), (2) established ≥10 
years, and (3) program structure.  Latin America was chosen as the site for the cases as the region 
is of critical importance to the provision of global ecosystem services and reducing Climate 
Change due to the high biodiversity in the region. The region also has high poverty rates and 
dependency on natural resources which creates a flash point for resource use and the 
implementation of conservation strategies.  In addition, PES has increasingly become a policy tool 
in Latin America to protect the provision of ecosystem services. 
Costa Rica PES program is the longest running Government-financed program and has 
been well-documented and promoted as a model (in most part due to its longevity) for other 
countries to follow for a national level payment for ecosystem services program.  However, as 
noted in the literature research section, there is limited studies in researching the outcomes of 
environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity in Costa Rica’s PES program or any 
other PES program.  Los Negros Valley, Bolivia is a far lesser documented PES program, but 
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provides a strong case for User-financed PES program.  The reward system for the PES program 
is a direct result of negotiations between ecosystem services providers and downstream Users 
facilitated by an intermediary. 
Using the cases of Costa Rica and Los Negros is appropriate to develop analytical 
generalization, in this case generalization by expanding on an existing theory.   
3.1 Data Collection Methods 
 
Data was proposed to be collected through a focused interview and document analysis.  
Primary documents analyzed for the Costa Rica case study were retrieved from links provided by 
Fondo Nacional de Financimiento Forestal - FONAFIFO (The National Forestry Fund) found at 
www.fonafiffo.go.cr and include legislation (decrees), financial and modality statistics.  For the 
Los Negros, Bolivia case study the document: Fundación Natura Bolivia: Achievements to Date 
and Scale Up Plans shared by Fundación Natura Bolivia was used.    Other documentation was 
then used to verify data found in the informants’ documentation.  Multiple sources of data 
collection support triangulation and increases internal validity and reliability of the research 
findings (Yin 2009, Stake 2010, Yazan 2015).  Data triangulation is defined as using multiple 
source points to reach to a sort of “convergence of enquiry” (Yin,2009,115) to confirm or expand 
the researcher’s understanding of the data collected (Stake 2010). 
The primary sources of data collection employed for this research was a questionnaire that 
was to be followed by a focused interview and document analysis.  A focused interview’s main 
purpose is “to corroborate information that you already know” (Yin, 2009,107).  The data 
collection procedure created for the questionnaire and interview was to firstly forward the 
questionnaire to the informant and then follow-up with an interview via Skype.  However, during 
the course of scheduling a Skype call, the informant chose to fill in the questionnaire outside of 
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the interview and forwarded the completed questionnaire.   The second informant chose to not 
conduct the interview but forwarded documentation based on the questions in the questionnaire 
and fielded additional questions and clarifications through email.  Both provided links to data on 
their organizational website which provided additional data. 
The most appropriate corrective action that could have been implemented to address the 
non-participation in the questionnaire/interview process would be to select another case.  However, 
time constraints and lack of another appropriate case selection did not allow for choosing another 
case.  Two other cases in Ecuador had been selected as options 1 and 2 for the case study.  
However, an earthquake resulted in an informant from option 1 withdrawing from being a part of 
the research and option 2 was non-responsive.  
 As noted on the questionnaire (See Appendix B: Questionnaire), some of the data on the 
cases are widely and readily available through documentation.  However, corroboration was 
required to ensure the data was up to date.   
For the questionnaire, a mix of both open-ended and closed-ended questions were used.  
Closed-ended questions allowed for the collection of factual data such as a number of persons 
participating in the payment for ecosystems services.  Open-ended questions were included to 
allow the free flow of discussion that may have provided additional insights.  The questionnaire 
was standard for both case studies.   Due to the predominant language used in the targeted region 
for the cases, the questionnaires were presented in both English and Spanish. The questionnaire 
was built based on Jack, Kousky and Sims (2008) which provides a blue-print for best practices 
for environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity.  
Documentation provides “broad coverage” (Yin, 2009,103), but bias can be created based 
on (1) the researchers’/authors’ biases and (2) my own selective bias (Yin 2009).  To decrease 
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biases, primarily, documentation was accessed from the questionnaire responses and data sharing, 
and secondarily through an exhaustive review of available documentation on (1) PES design, (2) 
PES program case studies and (3) outcomes being analyzed.    
Informants used for the case studies were Fundación Natura Bolivia and The National 
Forestry Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financimiento Forestal - FONAFIFO). 
3.2 Data Analysis 
 
Coding 
The coding process was performed manually using descriptive coding (Saldana 2009) for 
questionnaire and email question responses.  Using the manual process was suitable due to the 
small amount of data that was being coded.  The questions had predefined codes which were 
synthesized to ensure they were mutually exclusive (Saldana 2009).   Synthesizing the codes 
resulting in 3 categories and 9 sub-categories as presented in Table 2.  Codes used were verified 
to be mutually exclusive (Saldana 2009).  The definition for the categories and sub-categories 
was guided by Camhi (2012) and Jack, Kousky and Sims (2008), and are discussed further in 
the Findings section. 
 
Table 1:  Categories and sub-categories of the coding process 
Categories Sub-Categories 
Environmental Effectiveness Policy/Institutional Framework  
Monitoring 
Compliance and Enforcement  
Sustainability of the Provision of Ecosystem 
Services  
Sustainability of Program 
Cost Effectiveness Payment structure 





An example of the coding process is demonstrated below.   The example used highlights 
that a question with predefined codes can elicit additional content that may fit predefined codes or 
emerging codes (Saldana 2009).  In the discussed example, the content fits predefined codes as 
explained below. 
Interview Question: Is there any [intentional targeting of the poor] in the RWA? 
Code: social and economic data used for targeting 
Interview Response:  1[No], we target poor communities in Bolivia, but the 2[critical criteria for 
whether a farmer is eligible for voluntary participation is does the person have a piece of land 
that provides an environmental service]. 
 
1  Category: Equity 
Sub-category: Distribution 
Code: Socio-economic data not used for targeting 
2 Category: Environmental effectiveness 
Sub-category: Sustainability of the Provision of Ecosystem Services  
Code: targeted approach 
Analyzing Categories 
The categories and sub-categories created in the coding process as presented in Table 2 
were used in the analysis.  Seventeen indicators were developed to identify the presence of each 
sub-category. If an indicator was determined as present, a ‘Yes’ was marked to that indicator.  The 
‘Yes’ was then assigned a score of 1.  If an indicator was not determined as present, a ‘No’ was 
marked to that indicator.  The ‘No’ was then assigned a score of 0.   
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By summing up the 1s and 0s from each sub-category, a numerical value was determined 
for each category.  A 9 point interval scale, demonstrated in Table 2, was used to produce a 
subjective determination of the level at which each case study achieved the individual category. 
 




Weights were then added to raw scores of specific sub-categories of the environmental 
effectiveness and equity categories.   The addition of weights was used to increase the importance 
of specific sub-categories and compare those weighted scores for the user-financed case study and 
the Government-financed case study. 
The cost-effectiveness category was analyzed differently from the other two categories.  
One sub-category was assessed under the cost effectiveness category, i.e., payment structure.  In 
addition to the payment structure sub-category, indicators from the environmental effectiveness 
and equity categories were used as variables to assess the two case studies level of achieving cost 
effectiveness.  Not all indicators were used; only indicators associated with bearing costs were 
used.   
A table was created to assign selected indicators as either bearing high transaction costs or 
low transaction costs.  The results from the payment structure category were included in the table 
as well.  Indicators are appropriate to use as they “reflect changes in a particular context” (Church 




0 1 to 3 4 to 6 7 to 9 
Not indicated Low  Medium High 
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3.3 Protection of Human Subjects 
The questionnaire was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
through an expedited Review Procedure as it qualified as no more than minimal risk to human 
subjects.  
Informants were forwarded a consent form (See Appendix C: Consent Form) and asked to 
indicate acceptance via email prior to the questionnaire being sent to them.  The consent form 
informed them about (1) the scope, (2) risks and benefits, (3) confidentiality, (4) voluntary nature 
of their participation and (4) contact information for any questions or concerns about the 
questionnaire or overall research.   
3.3 Limitations 
 
Major limitations are noted in conducting the case study.  Firstly, my inability to conduct 
in-person interviews with informants due to lack of resources made it challenging to lock-in 
informants to an interview schedule.  The data collection methodology in the data collection 
procedure was amended to ensure that data would be received from the individual case informants.  
Amending the data collection decreased the robustness of the case study.   
Conducting a multiple case study is time-consuming and can be expensive, however, the 
more cases within a multiple case study, the stronger the replication logic (literal or theoretical) 
(Yin 2009).  While, this thesis includes two distinct program structure to investigate units of 
observation of Payment for Ecosystem Services program, the inclusion of additional cases under 
the individual program structures would increase the replication logic of the study.  Due to 
accessibility to data on additional cases and time constraints, additional cases could not be 
included. 
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Lastly, the use of indicators to determine the presence of the three policy outcomes may 
affect the validity and reliability of the study (Patton, 1996, 159).  There are no existing 
standardized indicators of PES evaluation.  I attempt to establish indicators based on exhaustive 





Chapter 4 describes the findings of the data collected for the case studies.  Table 3 provides 
a summary of the results for the categories of environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and 
equity. 
The Costa Rica PES indicated that the program structure enabled the program to have high 
environmental effectiveness and equity outcomes.  For the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal 
Water Agreements Program (RWA) indicated the program structure enabled a medium level of 
environmental effectiveness, but a high level of equity outcomes (Table 3).   The Government-
financed program had a greater number of low transaction cost elements than high transaction cost 
elements indicating that the program structure is somewhat cost-effective.  For the User-financed 
PES program, the high transaction cost elements were greater than the low transaction cost 
elements indicating a program structure that is less cost-effective than the Government-financed 
PES program (Table 4). 
 
 Table 3: Summary of Findings for Environmental Effectiveness and Equity - Costa Rica National PES 
and Los Negros Valley, Bolivia 
 
    
  Categories 
Country 
Environmental Effectiveness Equity 
Costa Rica 7  7  
Bolivia 4   7 
      
Range 
0 = not present             low  1 - 3                Medium 4 – 6            High 7 – 9 
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Table 4: Summary of Findings for Cost Effectiveness - Costa Rica National PES and Los Negros Valley, Bolivia 
 
Low Transaction Cost 




Costa Rica 4   2 
Los Negros Valley, 
Bolivia 2   3 
 
4.0  Case Study Context 
 
4.0.1 Government-financed Payment for Ecosystem Services - Costa Rica National Payment  
for Ecosystem Services Program  
 Costa Rica is situated in Central America and has forests of high biological diversity 
value (Committee on Noneconomic and Economic Value of Biodiversity and Commission on Life 
Sciences, 1999).  A system of national parks has been established to protect the country’s diversity.  
However, during the period 1970 – the early 80’s, the country’s high biodiversity was being over-
exploited by cattle ranching and agriculture, resulting in high deforestation.  Agriculture, logging, 
cattle ranching and related commercial activities were being supported by Government policies 
which allowed for subsidies and loans directed at these industries.  The result was forest cover 
decreasing to 20% from a high of 70% (Porras, Barton, Chacón-Cascante and Miranda, 2013,5).   
In 1997, Costa Rica’s National Payment for Ecosystem Services program (7Pago por 
Servicios Ambientales – PSA) program was implemented as one of the policy responses to 
significant deforestation.   Forestry Law No. 7575 of 1996, the legal framework for PES, was 
enacted allowing for the implementation of payment for ecosystem services in Costa Rica, marking 
                                                 
7      The literal English translation is Payment for Environmental Services, however to remain consistent with the 
document the term Ecosystem is used. 
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the first national PES program.  The law prescribes for contracting land enrollment for the 
provision of four ecosystem services:  
• Carbon sequestration 
• Watershed protection 
• Biodiversity protection 
• Scenic beauty 
The ecosystem services are sold as a bundle.  PES implementation was perceived as a more 
cooperative compliment to protected areas.  According to Vatn (2010), the progression for PES in 
Costa Rica is normative as PES programs are implemented within an existing institutional 
framework. The Costa Rica PES program has a total of 340,432.99 hectares contracted under the 
payment for ecosystem services program.  Land under PES is spread across the country’s 7 
provinces (Figure 6).   Five thousand and eighty-one (5,081) contracts are currently within the 
program.  The provinces of Puntarena and Limon have the largest hectares contracted under PES 
with 76,971.12 and 66,858.82 hectares respectively, while the province of Guanacaste has the 
largest number of PES contracts with 1,259.   
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The PES Program has a total of 68 thematic areas: (1) forest protection, (2) reforestation, 
(3) agroforestry system, (4) forest management based on pre-determined conservation area, (5) 
natural forest regeneration and (6) existing forest plantations.  
According to FONAFIFO, the “National Forestry Development Plan goal is to maintain 
land under PES in the low 300 thousand hectares” (email questionnaire response, FONAFIFO, 
May 4, 2016). 
                                                 
8      Each thematic area has 17 modalities: (1) forest protection, (2) water resource protection, (3) forest protection in conservation 
gaps, (4) protection within protected areas, (6) afforestation, (7) reforestation with native species endangered, (8) reforestation 
protection areas, (9) Second Harvests – management of existing forest plantation, (10) natural generation for Clean Development 
Mechanism, (11) natural regeneration, (12) natural regeneration of forests productive potential, (13) agroforestry systems, (14) 
agroforestry for coffee production, (15)  agroforestry systems for endangered species of trees, (16) agroforestry systems for native 
species and (17) forest management.  www.fonaifo.go.cr/psa 
Figure 5:  Contracts and hectares under PES per provinces. Source: FONAFIFO, 2016 
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The PES program was designed through participatory consultation with various sectors 
including the forest and tourism sectors, indigenous people, Ministry of the Environment and 
Energy (MINAE), National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) and National Forestry Office 
(ONF) and continues to be revised.  Costa Rica’s PES Program is administered by The National 
Forestry Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financimiento Forestal - FONAFIFO), which falls within the 
Ministry of the Environment and Energy, a Government entity.  FONAFIFO has established eight 
regional offices to serve PSA participants. 
 
4.0.2  User-Financed Payment for Ecosystem Services - Los Negros Valley, Bolivia    
PES/Reciprocal Watershed Agreement 
The Los Negros Valley is located in the Department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia, South 
America.  Bolivia has high biodiversity, particularly its cloud forests which is home to endemic 
bird species, however, these forests are at high risk for deforestation and forest degradation.  For 
the indigenous Andean communities surrounding the Los Negros Watershed, these cloud forests 
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are a source of clean drinking water.  In the Andean culture, water is held “as a universal and 
communal right” and its distribution should be equal based on the “needs, traditions and 
community norms that respect the water cycle.”  Further, water is seen as free (common good) and 
should not be sold.   
  In 2003, the downstream community of Santa Cruz was at a crisis point after a long 
drought and low water flow and quantity, which made irrigation for crops challenging.  The 
downstream users held the upstream farmers responsible for the changes to the water quantity and 
quality due to the clearing of riparian forests within the watershed.  The non-Governmental 
organization, Fundación Natura Bolivia (Nature Foundation) assisted in the formation of a 
community-based PES program to protect the Los Negros Watershed.  With funding from the US 
Fish and Wildlife Foundation, Fundación Natura Bolivia facilitated 6 downstream irrigators and 
upstream farmers to negotiate contracts to preserve cloud forests and protect their livelihoods.  In 
Figure 6: PES conservation areas in the Los Negros Valley.  
Source: Asquith, Vargas and Wunder, 2007 
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exchange for every 10 hectares of forest not deforested, upstream landowners receive non-
monetary rewards in a beehive, apiculture training and barbed wire for compliance.   
An evolution of the initial PES program has resulted in the program being formally titled 
as Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (Acuerdos Recíprocos por Agua – ARA).  Fundación Natura 
Bolivia asserts that the term “payment” should not be used in non-monetary schemes and promotes 
RWA as an “alternative to PES” (Asquith 2014). The purpose of the Reciprocal Watershed 
Agreements (RWA) is to protect the water supply through the protection of upstream forests and 
creating an enabling environment for downstream water users to contribute to such forest 
protection (Fundación Natura Bolivia).  Currently, 95 farmers are enrolled to protect 4,500 
hectares of forests.  
 
4.1 Findings for Environmental Effectiveness Category 
Environmental effectiveness is defined as the degree to which the contracted provision of 
ecosystem services is achieved (Porras, Barton, Chacón-Cascante and Miranda, 2013,5).  There 
are five sub-categories used in this study to indicate environmental effectiveness in PES: (1) policy 
context/institutional framework, (2) monitoring, (3) compliance and enforcement, (4) 
sustainability of the provision of ecosystem services and, (5) sustainability of the program.  
The Costa Rica PES program scored a 7 for environmental effectiveness which is 
considered as a high level for environmental effectiveness based on the 9- point scale.  Los Negros 
Valley RWA scored a 4 which indicates a medium level of environmental effectiveness.  The 
environmental effectiveness category is further discussed supported by results from the sub-




 Table 5: Summary Findings for Environmental Effectiveness Category 
 
4.1.1  Policy Context/Institutional Framework 
Two indicators were used in the policy context/institutional framework sub-category: 
a) Legislative legitimacy - refers to the establishment of the PES by legislation, decree, 
and other legal mechanisms giving authority for the management structure and other 
guiding principles for the PES. 
b) Political support – refers to tangible buy-in, recognition and support from decision-
makers for the PES at the formal political level, e.g. national and local Governments.  
 
Table 6: Findings for Policy Context/Institutional Framework Category 
 
 
        





















Rica 2 2 1 1 1 7 
Los 
Negros 1 1 1 1 0 4 





 indicated = 0 
Low = 1 -3 Medium = 
4-6 
High =  
7-9   
   Indicators 
Policy and  
Institutional 
Framework 
Country Political Support Legal Legitimacy 
Costa Rica 1 1 
Los Negros, Bolivia 1 0 
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a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (Score: 2)  
Costa Rica’s PES Program has legal legitimacy through the enactment of Forestry Law No. 
7575 of 1996.  Forestry Law No. 7575 provides for the establishment of PES as a policy tool and 
for the institutional framework to operationalize the policy. The National Forestry Fund 
(FONAFIFO) is the implementing agency for the PES program.  FONAFIFO is a component of 
the Ministry of the Environment and Energy (MINAE), a Government entity headed by a Minister 
of Government.  The placement of the implementing agency for PES within a Government 
Ministry is critical to the long-term viability of the PES program and provides strong political 
support for the national PES program.  
Amendments, through legal decrees, have been made to the legislation to address gaps and 
make the program more effective.  A historical review of the PES program informs that 
amendments have included new modalities and a targeted approach that recognizes: (1) 
“heterogeneity in land productivity” (Alix-Garcia, de Janvry and Sadouletand, 2008), (2) the risk 
of deforestation, (3) the conservation value of land, and (4) poor landowners and non-traditional 
land possession.    
b)    Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score: 1) 
 Los Negros Valley RWA is local in scope and is not directly supported by national or 
local legislation9.   Funds for purchasing the program rewards (beehive, apicultural training, and 
barbwire fencing) for participants in the RWA is disbursed through the Municipal Government.  
The inclusion of a Government entity as an integral actor in the disbursement process indicates 
                                                 
9 Scaling up of RWA is occurring across Bolivia amassing 36 municipalities implementing the program as well as in 
neighboring countries.  However, the research area being investigated is singular and specific to Los Negros Valley, 
therefore the reference to the RWA being local in scope. 
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that the Los Negros Valley RWA has significant political support, specifically at the Municipal 
Government level.  
Municipal Governments have been given legislative power over natural resources 
management through the Law of Popular Participation 1581 of 1994 also known as the 
decentralization law.  The legislation also formalized the relationship between civil society and 
the Government of Bolivia (Seemann 2004).  Indirectly, the Law of Popular Participation gives a 
degree of legal legitimacy to the Los Negros RWA giving legal recognition of the role of civil 
society in resources management in Bolivia.  However, there is no legislation dedicated to the 
operationalization of RWA in Bolivia. 
Further, Fundación Natura Bolivia  (10Nature Foundation of Bolivia) as a non-
Governmental (non-profit) organization has acted as a facilitator for the program and has received 
international donor funding for the start-up costs and operations. The ability to attract funding and 
to operationalize the program, shows de facto legal legitimacy of the RWA program, however, this 
is the extent of any legal backing for the Los Negros RWA.   
The lack of a legal framework for the Los Negros RWA is Bolivia’s unstable political 
environment and disjointed environmental policy context may have a direct influence on the non-
existent enabling legal environment for RWA in Los Negros.    
4.1.2   Monitoring 
 The monitoring category has two indicators: 
a) Baseline: refers to the systematic collection of bio-physical data to establish the flow of 
ecosystem services against which any changes to ecosystems post-PES intervention can be 
measured.   
                                                 
10    Nature Foundation of Bolivia role is also comparative to that of an intermediary as discussed in the equity variable. 
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b) Monitoring for the provision of ecosystem services: refers to a planned monitoring program 
to ensure participants are providing ecosystem services in accordance with the PES 
contract. 
A counter-factual baseline is critical to determining whether or not a PES program is 
working in obtaining additionality, i.e. the provision of ecosystem services that would not occur 
without PES. The counter-factual baseline hypothesizes a scenario without and with PES (Wunder, 
Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation 2007) feeding into 
the design and monitoring of the PES. Without the establishment of counterfactual baseline, the 
evaluation of the real impact of PES is weak and can negatively affect environmental and cost-
effectiveness. 
 
Table 7: Findings for Monitoring Category 
 
a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score: 1)   
The baseline for the PES program was established in 1997 using Landsat imagery of forest 
cover.  In the early stages of the PES program, a “static baseline” (Wunder, Efficiency of Payments 
for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation 2007) was used where payment was being 
made for forest-cover without the determination of whether forest protection would occur without 
PES.  Enrollment in the program was first-come, first accepted to match several criteria.  The 
evolution of the Costa Rica Program has resulted in more targeted approach through establishing 









Costa Rica 0 1 
Los Negros, Bolivia 0 1 
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national priorities for the selection of land to be enrolled in the program such as land to fill 
conservation of biodiversity gaps, land within biological corridors and land within critical 
watersheds.  As noted in the Policy and Institutional Framework section, a targeted PES program 
increases the environmental cost-effectiveness of the program. 
b)  Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1) 
One known baseline data collection was done through Landsat imagery in 2001, similarly 
as was done in the Costa Rica Program.  The image captured land use types for Los Negros.  No 
hydrological baseline studies were conducted and the information used to initiate the program in 
2003 was based on associating low water levels with upland deforestation.   
Monitoring for ecosystem services provision is conducted in both programs through field 
visits to farms enrolled under PES as well as geospatial technology to track and monitor the PES 
Program.  As discussed in the Compliance and Enforcement section, both programs use proxies to 
assess additionality - provision of ecosystem services.  Proxies are contracted actions or non-
actions, e.g. not cutting a certain hectare of forests or planting a specified number of trees, with 
the end goal being the additional provision of ecosystem services.   
Monitoring is critical to ensuring adherence to the contract, and ostensibly the actual 
provision of ecosystem services, thus improving environmental effectiveness as well as building 
trust between seller and buyer. As one of the downstream irrigators in Santa Cruz said: 
For us, it is very important that we have an environmental committee to monitor if 
they are really looking after the watershed or not. (RARE, Watershed Protection in 
Bolivia: Reciprocal Water Agreements 2010) 
 Costs associated with monitoring can be considered high transaction cost or a low 
transaction cost.  An untargeted PES will require more monitoring, increasing cost (high-cost 
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transaction).  Contrastingly, a targeted PES can allow for a tailored monitoring program and reduce 
costs. 
 
4.1.3  Compliance and Enforcement 
PES has two models for payments: output based and input based payments. Output-based 
payments require direct measurement of additional provision of ecosystem services.  Carbon 
sequestration is the only ecosystem services for which output based payments have been made.  
Input based or proxy based payments reward land owners for land-use behaviors such as not 
clearing forests, planting a number of trees etc. or outcomes from these actions such as increased 
forest cover.  The theoretical underpinning is that these activities should provide ecosystem 
services as the opposite action degrades or causes loss to ecosystem services.  Using proxies can 
be effective if a strong causal relationship can be ascertained between the proxy and the expected 
provision of ecosystem services (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008).   
Appropriate proxies contribute to the environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness 
by improving the opportunity to secure additional ecosystems services.  A direct relationship 
between the PES intervention and changes to ecosystems services can be better established. 
The compliance and enforcement sub-category has three indicators: 
a)  Payment based on output based performance: refers to payment based on the measured 
provision of ecosystem services (additionality). For example, carbon sequestration can be 
calculated by the number of tress, types of species, age of trees etc. 
b)  Payment based on appropriate proxies: refers to payment based on actions such as the 
number of trees planted, hectares not deforested etc. and associates the input with changes 
to the ecosystem services targeted.  “Appropriate proxies” relates to the certainty between 
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proxies and the provision of ecosystem services desired (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008, 
9467). 
c) Enforcement of contract:  refers to the administration of the contract signed through 
enrollment and the imposition of sanctions when the terms of the contract are violated. 
 
Table 8: Findings for Compliance and Enforcement Sub-category 
 
a)   Costa Rica’s National PES program (score: 2)  
Payment for land enrolled under PES is input based versus output-based.  The Costa Rica 
PES program contracts land under PES based on priority areas with identified conservation values.   
An Executive Decree is issued indicating the priority modalities, the maximum hectares for each 
modality and the priority land-use types. Costa Rica’s PES program uses a targeted approach to 
PES participation which improves the certainty of the proxy. 
FONAFIFO explained the enforcement of the PES contract: 
All conditions of the contract are enforced and the contract compliance rate is 98%. 
Enforcement is through the control and scheduled payments, in addition to [the use of] 
all applicable legislation.  
Sanctions may include the termination of contract and repayment of funds paid to seller 
and removal from the PES program.    
b)   Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1) 




Payment based on 
provision of ecosystem 
services 




Costa Rica 0 1 1 
Bolivia 0 0 1 
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The Los Negros Valley, Bolivia RWA is also input based.  Enrollment of farmers into the 
RWA is dependent on the ability of their land to provide the desired ecosystem services. The 
process to determine the ecosystem services provision is untargeted as all farmers in the upstream 
area (Santa Cruz) are invited to enroll.  Accepted lands are mapped after which a conservation area 
is set aside as land under PES.  The untargeted approach decreases the certainty of the proxy. 
 The conditions of the contract are enforced.  Sanctions for non-compliance include the 
return of the incentive or its value in cash.  
 
4.1.4  Sustainability of the Provision of Ecosystem Services 
 Reforestation can take between 50 – 100 years.  Using a minimum realistic timeframe for 
the growth of secondary forests into shrubs (Food and Agriculture Organization), a contract period 
of not less than 5 years was assigned for the indicator of Sustainability of the Provision of 
Ecosystem Services.  
The sustainability of the provision of ecosystem services has one indicator: 
a)  Contract term < 5 years:  refers to the timeframe which the landowner has agreed to have 
their land under PES being greater than 5 years.  
 
Table 9:  Findings for Sustainability of Provision of Ecosystem Services Category 
   Indicators 
Sustainability of the Provision 
of Ecosystem Services 
Country Contract term < 5 yrs 






a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:1)   
Contracts terms are formulated by FONAFIFO and published in the La Gaceta, the Official 
Gazette (a publication which forms part of the legal requirement for public notification).  Contracts 
are differentiated based on the modality.  For the priorities for 2015 which are reforestation and 
afforestation contracts, the contract terms are between 5 – 16 years: Reforestation <9; afforestation 
10 – 16 years based on tree species; agroforestry and forest management = 5 years. 
b) Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score: 1) 
The RWA contract term is for a period of 5 years for land in upstream with the option for 
renewal.   
 
4.1.5      Sustainability of Program  
A PES which does not have long-term financing mechanisms is likely to be 
environmentally ineffective due a lack of permanence associated with a disrupted PES 
program. 
a) Long-term funding:  refers to the availability of funding for the long-term to support the 
costs related to the implementation of PES. 
  
Table 10: Findings for Sustainability of Program Sub-category 












a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:1) 
A diverse funding base for the Costa Rica program supports the likelihood of long-term 
financing for the continuation of the program.  Diversification of the funding base was a result of 
evaluation the financial mechanism for PES. 
The fuel tax has given a minimum stability to the Programme, but we have been 
constantly exploring fresh sources. We quickly realized that as a small country we 
were not going to be able to compete under the original Kyoto and Clean Development 
Mechanisms, so we looked inside our own country instead (I. Porras 2012). 
Funding sources for Costa Rica: 3.5% fuel tax, budget allocation by the State, sale of 
greenhouse gases emission credits on international markets, sale of ecosystem services certificates 
for businesses donating towards payment for ecosystem services as credit towards conservation, 
sale of hydrological services to hydroelectric plants, allocations to the National Forestry Financing 
Fund and international donors.  According to FONAFIFO:  
the bulk of the budget comes from the excise tax on fuels, but [there are] other sources such 
as 11water canon, the voluntary carbon markets, some awards or payments for biodiversity and the 
tourism sector contributions. 
Costa Rica’s PES program appears to be designed to be innovative and diverse in its 
funding base to reduce any potential impact of policy cycles associated with Government-financed 
PES Programs (Arriagada and Perrings 2009). 
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1) 
                                                 
11      The water canon is tax created to pay small forestry owner in high conservation priority areas.  Water Users are 
charged the tax based on the purpose of the use of the water and quality use.  Executive Decree No. 26635-MINAE 
of 18 December 1997 
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Downstream water users of Los Negros pay US$.50 as a water tariff.  The water tariff is a 
component of the PES financial mechanism from which the Santa Cruz upstream farmers are 
rewarded for the provision of ecosystem services.  Funds collected from the water tariff and other 
funding sources are used to purchase in-kind rewards for the upstream which includes beehive and 
barb wire, as well as technical training.   
  International donor funding has also been infused into RWA for implementation.   Secure 
long-term funding is influenced by the agreements signed between the parties, however, if the 
buyer chooses to withdraw from the program, the long-term financial security may be threatened.  
One of the primary differences between a user-financed and Government financed PES program 
is that in the user-financed program there is direct seller-buyer negotiations and payments.   The 
Coasean approach to PES states that a buyer/user would only withdraw from a program when the 
ecosystem services are no longer being provided  (Arriagada and Perrings 2009).  Withdrawal of 
the buyer from the PES when the services are no longer being provided would be indicative of a 
PES structure working as it should.   
However, the RWA is not a simple buyer-seller structured user-financed program.  In the 
Los Negros RWA, the buyers include direct beneficiaries (downstream irrigators) as well as local 
Government (municipal government) and indirect global beneficiaries (external funder).  The 
withdrawal any one funding source could prove detrimental for this PES Program, therefore, it is 
considered to not have long-term sustainability. 
 
4.2     Findings for the Equity Category 
Equity is defined as the fair distribution of costs and benefits through inclusive 
participation and decision-making and recognition of traditional rights, norms, and knowledge. 
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There are three sub-categories for the Equity category: (1) property rights requirement, (2) 
distribution and, (3) social legitimacy.  
a) Property rights requirement: refers to the property rights required for enrollment in the 
PES program 
b) Distribution: refers to who bear the costs and benefits of the program 
c) Social legitimacy: refers to buy-in and support at the community level for the PES program. 
 
Table 11:  Summary of Equity Category Findings 
  Sub-categories 
Equity 
Country 













2 1 1 4 
        
  
  No present 
 indicated = 0 
Low = 1 -3 
Medium = 
4-6 
High =  
7-9 
 
4.2.1  Property Rights 
PES requires well-defined property rights to secure the provision of services.  Requiring 
property rights can preclude the poorest from participating in PES programs (Vatn 2010, 1248) 
and is indicative of the inherent inequity of PES. 
The property rights sub-category has three indicators: 
a) Land title: refers to formalized land ownership recognized and registered in the 
Government cadastral system. 
b) Traditional land management:  refers to recognized traditional land ownership such as 
communal lands. 
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c) Alternative land possession:  refers to the recognition of land without formalize ownership 
such as land squatting. 
 Table 12:  Findings for Property Rights Requirement Sub-category 
 
a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:2)  
As part of the enrollment process, a land owner interested in participating in the PES 
program must submit a land title or other ownership documents.  The land title is verified with 
FONAFIFO’s cadastral system for authenticity. 
The land title requirement does not apply to indigenous groups who use traditional land 
management, i.e. communal land management.  Communal lands are formally recognized by 
Costa Rica’s National Land System.  The acceptance of communal land in the PES system is not 
a direct equity strategy from within the PES program, but a by-product of national equity and 
human rights policy actions that contributes to equity in the PES program. 
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:2) 
Traditional land ownership (titling) in the rural areas of Bolivia is an anomaly rather than 
the norm.  Land ownership is complex with few farmers possessing Government issued titles with 
most landowners possess generational purchase agreements. In addition, the rural areas are 
populated by indigenous groups who use communal land management.  











Costa Rica 1 1 0 
Bolivia 1 0 1 
53 
The RWA has a major challenge with landless immigrants, referred to as colonists, who 
squat on private land not fenced (demonstrating ownership) or land within conservation areas 
(Asquith, Vargas and Wunder 2008).  As these immigrants do not possess the elusive Government 
issued titles or the generational ownership through purchase contracts, they are not included in the 
RWA.  However, the landless immigrants have an effect on the RWA as they deforest in critical 
forest areas (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder 2008). 
 
4.2.2  Distribution 
The distribution category has two indicators: 
a) Smaller properties <50 hectares included 
b) Socio-economic data used in targeting 
 






a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:2)  
The Costa Rica PES program allows the registration of property less than 50 hectares for 
inclusion in the PES program.  Properties less than 50 hectares that are within identified critical 
conservation areas are prioritized as important to include in the PES program.  That importance is 
 









data used in 
targeting 
Costa Rica 1 1 
Bolivia 1 0 
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highlighted by assigning 25 additional points for these types of properties in calculating the 
optimal properties to achieve the PES goals.  The inclusion of smaller properties is indicative of a 
PES program’s attempt to include poorer land owners and make the program more equitable. 
Central to Costa Rica’s PES program is the integration of environmental protection, 
economic development and poverty alleviation in the program design.  Notably, in the preamble 
of the Executive Decree No. 39083 which declares the priority areas for the period of July 2015, 
Costa Rica’s National Development Plan is identified as the overarching guiding principle for 
defining priority areas.  The Development Plan is built on the principles of social and economic 
justice to alleviate poverty.   
The focus on poverty alleviation per the Development Plan is indicated in the scoring for 
priority areas with criteria such as forests within indigenous communities’ territory awarded 85 
points, the highest additional assigned score.  Additionally, forest farms in districts with a Social 
Development Index (SDI) of less than 43.4% receive 10 additional points.  The SDI is used to 
target low-income areas that are also within the conservation target areas, however, the Index is 
criticized for not fulfilling the objective of inclusion of the poorest in PES (I. Porras 2012).  
However, while there are efforts to address equity through creating a targeting approach, there are 
program design problems which are critical barriers to the poor entering the PES program as well 
as a significant threat to environmental effectiveness as one PES participant explained: 
PES has helped us a lot and has given me the opportunity to ensure my economic 
future, not one hundred percent, but I am not complaining. The paperwork to obtain 
PES is getting more difficult… I don’t know whether I will be eligible in the next 
period…if I am not eligible, I will probably start cutting, and SINAC [the 
conservation area authority] does not have the capacity to stop us (Barton 2014). 
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  Intermediaries can be beneficial in assisting participant’s in enrolling in the PES program, 
but there are costs associated with the inclusion of intermediaries that not all PES participants are 
able to afford. 
b) Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (Score:1) 
Properties that are 1 hectare and above can be enrolled in the RWA.  Los Negros Valley’s 
population is mainly poor, indigenous people and landless migrants.  Targeting the poor or special 
groups is not a part of the RWA as the situational context makes these groups natural participants.  
As Fundación Natural Bolivia explained, targeting the poor is not a consideration in enrolling 
participants in the program.  
No, we target poor communities in Bolivia, but the critical criteria for whether a 
farmer is eligible for voluntary participation is does the person have a piece of 
land that provides an environmental service. 
The landless migrants, discussed in the property rights requirement sub-category, are not 
part of the RWA program.   
 
4.2.3  Social Legitimacy 
The social legitimacy sub-category has three indicators: 
a) Participatory/Consultative Process:  refers to the inclusion of critical stakeholders in the 
design, implementation and evaluation of PES process 
b) Awareness/Education Programs: refers to intentional actions to inform and educate PES 
participants and potential participants about PES. 
c) Intermediaries:  refers to organizations, individuals, etc. who act as the go-between for the 




Table 14:  Findings for Social Legitimacy Sub-category 
    Indicators 







Costa Rica 1 1 1 
Bolivia 1 1 1 
 
a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:3)  
According to FONAFIFO, the Costa Rica National PES program design and evaluation “is 
a dynamic process of constant revision, always with the participation of various sectors, producers, 
indigenous, MINAE, SINAC, ONF” (Email questionnaire response, FONAFIFO, May 4, 2016). 
Using a participatory approach in design and evaluation is likely to create greater acceptance in 
the local communities creating social legitimacy.  Social legitimacy supports political buy-in as 
politicians are more likely to support a program that does not have community resistance.   
 Both social and political support can be linked to environmental effectiveness with the 
former contributing to securing PES land from leakage and in the provision of ecosystem services, 
whilst the latter ensures long-term funding.  A participatory approach with diverse stakeholders 
also provides an enabling environment for building an equitable PES Program.   
With amendments to the institutional structure, regional FONAFIFO offices have been 
established throughout the country allowing for more direct interaction with PES participants.  The 
establishment of local offices is a significant change to the program structure that can improve 
targeting and monitoring increasing environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness. 
Public awareness and education is continuous, particularly to gain and maintain the trust 
of communities to participate in the PES program.  Building and maintain trust is critical to the 
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success of the PES Program.  In the past, landowners, particularly indigenous people, have 
expressed concerns that PES was an attempt to take their land rights. 
When the PES began, people were confused. They thought that if we sold the air 
from the trees, it was a step from there to lose our land (I. Porras 2012) 
    
You should understand that during the last 25 years, under the banner of ‘protecting 
the environment’ the authorities have progressively taken our land rights, which 
IDA [Land Reform Institute] previously said were ours… so it’s natural that us 
locals are angry (Barton 2014). 
FONAFIFO has focused on increasing trust and social legitimacy through establishing 
local offices, public awareness, and education.  Intermediaries also play a critical role in bridging 
the information gap between PES and applicants, particularly for the indigenous communities.   
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), community organizations and farmer 
cooperatives act as intermediaries where they negotiate PES contract for a group of landowners 
with FONAFIFO.  In a now revised program structure, intermediaries would sell the ecosystem 
services to FONAFIFO and sign the contract on the behalf of the land owners they represented.  
However, FONAFIFO revised the PES program whereby if an intermediary is used, the individuals 
the intermediary is representing must sign an individual contract with FONAFIFO.   
b) Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:3) 
The RWA management approach is highly participatory and consultative amongst the 
supporting institution/intermediary, Fundación Natura, the communities of Los Negros and Santa 
Cruz, Water Cooperatives and the Municipal Government.  A key outcome of the participatory 
environment is the in-kind and technical training rewards structure which was specifically chosen 
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by the sellers as fulfilling an income-generation need. Trust-building has been a major challenge 
for the implementation of RWA.  The lack of trust is tied to a general lack of trust in Government 
and other authorities based on Bolivia’s history of corruption and marginalization of the poor and 
indigenous people.   
While there is no formal public awareness campaign in the Los Negros Valley, the trust 
building activities with the sellers and buyers have acted as an informal public awareness channel. 
Fundación Natura role as a supporting institution for the RWA extends also to the role as 
intermediary working with sellers and buyers.  The intermediary role is not self-declared by 
Fundación Natura. 
 
4.3    Findings: Cost-Effectiveness Category 
Cost-effectiveness is defined as the ability of a payment for ecosystem services program to 
achieve its environmental goals at the lowest possible cost compared with other strategies (Jack, 
Kousky and Sims 2008). 
There is one sub-category for the Cost Effectiveness Category in PES - payment structure.  
Using the findings from the Environmental Effectiveness and Equity categories and the findings 
of the payment structure sub-category, a determination is made on cost effectiveness. 
4.3.1  Payment Structure 
The payment structure category has two indicators: 
a) Differentiated payment: refers to payment structure created to include opportunity costs of 
PES participants and the conservation value of the forests being protected.  A PES 
participant protecting forests in a modality of high conservation value will get a different 
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per hectare payment compared to a participant protecting forests in a lesser conservation 
value area. 
b) Front loaded payment: refers to a payment structure which allows for a large percentage 
of funds to be paid upfront, i.e. in the 1st year of the contract.  For example, in year 1, a 
PES participant may receive 50%, year 2 – 20%, year 3 – 15%, year 4 – 10% and year 5 – 
5%.   
                              
Table 15: Findings of the Payment Structure Sub-category 








Costa Rica 1 1 
Bolivia 1 1 
 
Differentiated payments in PES programs is indicative of targeting based on pre-assigned 
conservation values and is considered to be cost effective.  Upfront payments help to cover sellers’ 
costs, especially for poorer participants. 
a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:2)  
Costa Rica’s PES program payment structure was revised from a flat payment structure, 
which is considered less cost-effective than a differentiated payment structure.   The differentiated 
payment structure is based on the modality the land is being enrolled.  Differentiated payment has 
been introduced for the modalities of:  forest protection, agroforestry systems, and reforestation.  
The 2015 Call for Participants indicates differentiated payment based on the conservation value of 
the land relevant to priority areas for PES (spatial targeting) and the type of species being planted 
(reforestation and afforestation modality). Natural Regeneration, forest management, and forest 
plantation are on a flat payment structure.   
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Front loaded payment is offered for the agroforestry and reforestation modalities with first 
payments at 50% in advance.  For the reforestation modality, front-loaded payment applies to PES 
activities on land 50 hectares or less.  The front-loaded payment for landholders with less than 50 
hectares is a signal of the PES program having been designed to be inclusive of poorer landholders. 
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1) 
A differentiated payment structure is utilized based on the number of hectares (based on a 
scale), forest types and use.   Payment ranges from US$1.5/hectare to US$3/hectare.  Los Negros, 
unlike Costa Rica’s PES program, does not pay participants in cash as the reward is through in-
kind payment or technical assistance.   Cash is used to purchase beehives, barbed-wires, and 
technical training, particularly apicultural training.  The reward was negotiated between 
sellers/buyers as the best option as one seller noted, “If I receive money, I will spend it quickly, 
but honey production has helped me diversify my income” (Fundacion Natura Bolivia 2015)   
Approximately 7 days after contract signing, the incentives are provided to the farmer, 
therefore, the RWA is considered as offering front-loaded payment.  
 
4.3.2     Analysis of transaction costs 
Transaction costs are all the costs involved in implementing the PES program including 
implementation costs and opportunity costs on the administrative end and costs for enrollment on 
the participants’ end.  Opportunity costs for the participants are not included in the transaction 
costs. 
Table 16 provides an analysis of the transaction costs of each case study.  Based on the 
exhaustive literature review, design elements of each case study were deemed either as low 
transaction cost elements or high transaction cost elements and assign to the appropriate category.  
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Table 16: Analysis of transaction costs 
    
 
Low Transaction Cost 
Elements   
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seller 
• targeted approach 
• bundling of 
services 
(4)   
• many small landholdings 
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• small group of 
buyers and sellers 
• payments from 
multiple buyers 
consolidated to 
provide payment to 
seller 
• bundled services 
 
(3)   
• untargeted PES 
• monitoring costs 







              (3) 
 
For the Government-financed PES program, the targeting of poorer landholders to improve 
equity in the PES program resulted in many small landholders which are considered a high 
transaction cost element (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008, Vatn 2010).  Intermediaries can play a 
crucial role in reducing transaction costs by being the representative of a group of small 
landholders.  Costa Rica’s PES program was restructured to not include group participation 
(excluding communal landholding), therefore the intermediary acts in a more consultative 
capacity.  Further, intermediaries are not a constant for cooperatives, etc. as FONAFIFO noted that 
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“there are organizations that support some of the owners of farms, but not always” (email response 
to questionnaire, FONAFIFO, May 4, 2016).  
Flat payment in a PES program is considered to be both environmental and cost ineffective 
(Wu Yang, et al. 2013, Engel, Wünscher and Wunder 2007).  Firstly, landholders with higher 
opportunity costs and higher ecosystem services provision may be deterred from entering the PES 
program, while those with lesser opportunity costs and lesser ecosystem services provision are 
more likely to enter.  The latter type of participant is also more likely to enter land into the PES 
program that would not have been deforested. 
Untargeted PES, monitoring costs, and uncertain proxies are inter-linked in increasing 
transaction costs for the user-financed program.  An untargeted program and uncertain proxies can 
result in payments being overpaid, payments made for land not providing additional provision, and 
makes monitoring more difficult. 
 
Table 17:  Findings of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
 
Low Transaction Cost 




Costa Rica 4   2 
Los Negros Valley, 
Bolivia 2   3 
 
The Costa Rica’s National PES program had 4 indicators considered to be of low 
transaction costs and 3 considered to be of high transaction costs.  Los Negros Valley Bolivia 
Reciprocal Watershed Agreements had 3 indicators considered to be of low transaction costs and 
3 considered to be of high transaction costs. 
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4.4 Weighted Scores  
  Weights were applied to the scores for the Environmental and Equity categories, with greater 
weights placed on the compliance and enforcement, and the monitoring sub-categories.  Higher 
weights were placed on the compliance and enforcement and monitoring indicating greater 
importance in achieving environmental effectiveness than the other sub-categories.  The two sub-
categories were assessed as critical to enabling Environmental Effectiveness as without 
compliance, enforcement and monitoring, a PES program would be ineffective in accounting 
whether there has been the provision of additional ecosystem services.   
As indicated in Table 18, the compliance and enforcement sub-category raw scores were 
weighed by 35% and the monitoring sub-category raw scores were weighted by 30%. 
 
Table 18:  Weighted Matrix for Environmental Effectiveness – Costa Rica PES Program and Los Negros, 
Bolivia RWA 
 
Environmental Effectiveness – Weighted Scores 
Sub-Categories 
Costa 
















Policy/Institutional 2 15 30 1 15 15 
Compliance &  
Enforcement 
2 
35 70 1 35 35 
Monitoring 1 30 30 1 30 30 
Sustainability of the 
provision of the 
Ecosystem services 
1 
20 20 1 20 20 
    100 150   100 100 
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Figure 7:  Comparison of Critical Sub-categories for Costa Rica and Los Negros,  
Bolivia PES programs 
The weighted scores for the Environmental Effectiveness category indicated that Costa 
Rica’s PES program is better designed to support compliance and enforcement than the Los 
Negros, Bolivia RWA.  However, as figure 8 demonstrates, when the monitoring sub-category 
scores were equally weighted across the two PES, both the Los Negros, Bolivia RWA and the 
Costa Rica PES programs indicated that the program structures were equally designed to support 
monitoring of the respective programs. 
The Equity Category scores were similarly weighed with the property rights requirements 
and the distribution sub-categories assessed as most critical to enabling equity in a PES program.  
At the foundation of PES concept is the requirement of land ownership/title.  However, the 
requirement of property ownership also creates a built-in inequity in PES that has to be addressed 
to create equity in any program.  The distribution sub-category is also critical to the PES program 
as it indicates who bears the costs and who benefits from the implementation of a PES program. 
  






provision of the Ecosystem services
Weighted Score for Environmental Effectiveness
Costa Rica Los Negros
Bolivia
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Table 19:  Weighted Matrix for Equity 




















Property Rights Requirements 2 40 80 2 40 80 
Distribution 2 35 70 1 35 35 




Figure 8:  Comparison of Critical Sub-categories for Costa Rica and Los Negros, Bolivia PES    
programs 
The weighted scores for the property rights requirements indicates that both the Costa Rica 
PES and the Los Negros, Bolivia RWA programs structure are equally designed to address inequity 
in the property rights requirements.  Within the property rights requirements sub-category, land 
title, communal land management and alternative land rights are listed as indicators in a PES 
program.   A PES program which allows for either communal land management or alternative land 
rights along with the requirement of a land title scores as more equitable.  Scoring only on the land 
title being the established inequity in PES would be indicative of a poorly designed structure for 
equity in PES.  




Weighted Score for Equity




The distribution sub-category weighted score showed that the Costa Rica PES program 
structure was better designed to support equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of the PES 








The findings of the study cannot be generalized due to the limited study conducted, 
however the findings can provide relevant information and lessons learnt to improve policy 
outcomes for PES programs. 
 
1. How does the user-financed PES program structure differ from Government-financed program 
in cost-effectiveness, environmental effectiveness, and equity? 
Two case studies were used to analyze the program structure of a User-financed PES 
program and a Government-financed PES program in their ability to support environmental 
effectiveness, equity and cost- effectiveness.  Existing PES theory is that user-financed programs 
are better able to provide environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness than Government-
financed PES programs.   The argument to support the existing theory that Government-financed 
programs are less environmentally effective and cost-effective is based on the assertion that a user-
financed PES program is focused on achieving "environmental goals/effectiveness” in contrast 
with Government- financed programs “often de facto come to politically drift into win-win spheres 
of multiple side-objectives, such as poverty alleviation, regional development, or electoral 
motives” (Wunder, 2013, 231).   
Based on the analysis of the two case studies, however, the Government-financed PES 
program had stronger indications of a program that is structured to support environmental 
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effectiveness compared with the User-financed PES program.  That result is in reference to the 
unweighted scores for all sub-categories of the environmental effectiveness category.   
Further analysis of the environmental effectiveness category where the scores were 
weighted, and the compliance and enforcement sub-category was assessed as the critical element 
to supporting environmental effectiveness produced a different result.  With weighted scores, both 
the user-financed PES program and the Government-financed program ranked equally in having a 
program structure able to support environmental effectiveness. 
Regarding cost-effectiveness, the Costa Rica PES program had a greater number of low-
cost activities than high-cost activities, indicating that the Government-financed PES program was 
better structured to enable a cost-effective program in comparison with the Los Negros Valley PES 
program.  In contrast to the Government-financed PES program, the User-financed PES had an 
equal number of low transaction costs activities and high transaction costs activities.    
The analysis for equity indicated that the Government-financed and User-financed PES 
programs were equally structured to support equity in PES implementation.  Notably, when the 
equity scores were weighted and the property rights requirements sub-category was assessed as 
the most critical to supporting equity, both the Government-financed and User-financed PES 
ranked equally.   This outcome is highly interesting as at the foundation of the Coasean PES theory 
is the requirement of land ownership/title.  However, within the property rights requirements sub-
category, land title is not the only indicator.  Indeed, the selection of the land title indicator only 
would indicate a program that is not designed to support equity.  The other indicators for the 
property requirement sub-category are communal land management and alternative land rights 
which are indicative of a PES program expanding property requirements to increase equity.   
Therefore, a PES program which allows for either communal land management or alternative land 
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rights along with the requirement of a land title is structured to be more equitable.  Scoring only 
on the land title being the established inequity in PES would be indicative of a poorly designed 
program for equity in PES.  
In terms of cost effectiveness, it is an accepted reality that there are trade-offs between 
cost-effectiveness and equity.  However, where equity strategies may on the surface increase 
transaction costs, the same strategies lend to environmental effectiveness and lower transaction 
costs in other areas.  A PES program that has low social legitimacy, has a high probability of not 
achieving its environmental objectives as issues of trust and conflict may arise (Martin, Gross-
Camp, Kebede and McGuire, 2014, 224), requiring more monitoring efforts and other 
interventions, therefore, increasing transaction costs.  Further, where the distributional benefits of 
PES appear to promote unfairness and further marginalize the poor, these communities may further 
seek to engage in activities which undermine the PES goal in adjacent properties creating leakage. 
The analysis showed that the Government-financed program was better structured to 
support environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness than the user-financed program.  
However, weighted scores identified that both programs are equally strong in program structure 
elements that significantly contribute to environmental effectiveness and equity.  From the two 
case study results, there is no inherent bias that a user-financed PES program is a better-structured 
program over a Government-financed program. 
 
2. Does the program structure or institutional design of payment for ecosystem services determine 
whether equity is planned for in the design of PES program?   
For the case studies in this research, the program structure of the PES program was a factor 
in whether equity is planned for and integrated into the design of the program.  In the Costa Rica 
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Government-financed PES, the principles of the country’s overarching National Development 
Plan was integrated into the PES design, influencing the payment structure, prioritization of equity 
targets along with conservation targets and the intentional inclusion of small farmers through 
acceptance of small properties in the program.  The inclusion of special groups such as indigenous 
people and the poor shapes the design of the PES in areas such as property rights requirements, 
where communal land rights are legitimized and in the use of socio-economic data in targeting.  
Equity strategies such as those integrated into Costa Rica’s PES program reduces “barriers to entry 
that would exclude poor communities or landowners” (Salzman,2009, 54). 
The User-financed program does not intentionally include equity considerations in its 
implementation.   However, as the RWA target communities are rural communities, which 
includes poor upstream providers and downstream users, socio-economic data is unintentionally 
part of the RWA implementation.   
A major failure to address equity in the Los Negros RWA is that the poorest and most 
likely to degrade ecosystem services are not included in the program (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder 
2008).  The exclusion of this group has significant implications for environmental effectiveness.  
Landless immigrants referred to as colonists squat on land not fenced or within conservation areas.  
As these immigrants do not possess Government issued titles or the generational ownership 
through purchase contracts, they are not included in the RWA.  However, Asquith, Vargas and 
Wunder (2008) contend that the landless immigrants deforest old primary forests at a higher rate 
than “land owners”.  Exclusion of the poor can significantly affect a PES program’s social 
legitimacy and environmental effectiveness. 
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The Government-financed PES in this study was better able to integrate equity strategies, 
particularly recognizing and including communal land management as formal property right and 





The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the program structure of two PES programs in the 
program’s ability to support environmental effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness.  Two case 
studies were used in the analysis: the Costa Rica National PES Program, a Government-financed 
program and the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA), a User-
financed Program.  This thesis also investigates the role of the type PES program structure in the 
inclusion of equity in PES design and implementation.  Based on lessons drawn from the study, 
the Government-financed PES program was better structured to support environmental 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and equity.  However, no conclusion was drawn that the type of 
PES program, i.e. user-financed or Government-financed programs determines a better-structured 
program.  Critically, the Government-financed PES program attempts to address the inherent 
inequity of PES in the requirement of property rights.  Property rights is a major barrier for the 
poor to enter into PES.  The recognition of communal land rights and the regularization of long-
term settlers to formal land ownership in the Costa Rica National PES program was a significant 
strategy to removing barriers for the poor from entering PES.  The inherent equity remains in the 
User-financed PES scheme despite the tangible effect on environmental effectiveness  
 Secondly, Government-financed PES programs face stronger political and social 
legitimacy pressures to integrate equity into PES.  For User-financed PES programs where the 
buyers are the Users of the ecosystems services, equity may be a secondary issue over 
environmental effectiveness and cost efficiency.   the Los Negros Valley RWA indicates, failure 
to address equity can reduce the environmental effectiveness and increase costs.  Addressing 
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equity as a critical part of PES is beneficial to achieving environmental effectiveness and reducing 
costs. 
 Thirdly and significantly, in regards to achieving the policy outcomes of environmental 
effectiveness and cost effectiveness, the type of program structure is not the determining factor.  
The Costa Rica National PES program demonstrated a more adaptive and flexible management 
approach, changing its approaches implemented earlier in the program to improve environmental 
and cost-effectiveness through spatial targeting, differentiated payments and bundling of services.  
As far as can be determined, the Los Negros Valley RWA has not had the same pace of change.         
Lastly, achieving the policy outcomes of environmental effectiveness and equity requires 
trade-offs in cost effectiveness.  Particularly, the inclusion of equity as a policy outcome and not 
a side objective has implications on cost effectiveness.  Case in point is the inclusion of small poor 
landholders which improves equity, but creates a high cost in transactions.  Continued evaluation 
and adaptation to findings can help to decrease costs and maintain and equitable PES program.  As 
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) affirms, a PES program works in the long-term if the communities 
benefit economically, socially and environmentally.     
 Undoubtedly payment for ecosystem services is evolving with environmental and socio-
economic context in which it is being implemented.  Scaling up of PES is being promoted through 
the REDD+ Initiative and increasingly developed and developing countries are implementing PES.  
With the evolution comes evaluation of what PES should look like and who should bear the costs 
and benefits.  There is clearly an undercurrent to shift and modernize the theory of PES from the 
Coasean approach which focuses on cost efficiency and environmental effectiveness to the 
“Muradian approach” of a holistic approach to include equity as a key design element of PES.   
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The gradual shift from the dominant “do no harm” or “the better off than before” approaches are 
not sufficient as real strategies must be implemented to improve the distributional outcomes of 
PES. 
 
6.1    Recommendations 
Based on the case studies investigated through this study, the following are recommendations to 
integrate environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity in Government financed and 
User-financed PES programs. 
6.1.0    Recommendation 1:     Payment for ecosystem services programs must not be static, but 
designed to create an adaptive and flexible program to allow for changes to improve achievement 
of objectives. 
6.1.1    Recommendation 2:     Equal weight should be given to Equity as a policy outcome in the 
design and implementation of the PES programs, whether Government or User-financed.  This is 
particularly appropriate and necessary in developing countries where there is high poverty and 
dependency on natural resources.    
6.1.2    Recommendation 3:    Baseline data for bio-physical and socio-economic data must be 
collected prior to the implementation of PES to reduce transaction costs (cost efficiency), 
environmental effectiveness and equity.  The data should be used to create a counter-factual 
baseline.  If a program is ongoing and no baseline data has been collected, a reconstructed baseline 
should be attempted using secondary data.  Additionality cannot be accurately measured either 
through output or input performance without baseline data.  Equity actions in PES program will 
not be successful unless they are targeted and based on sound scientific data. 
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6.1.3    Recommendation 4:    Priority areas for PES must be established and a targeted approach 
to PES undertaken to gain additionality (environmental effectiveness) and equity.  Untargeted 
implementation of PES program does not work (Pagiola, 2011, 12) and expends costs where 
provision of ecosystem services will not materialize. 
 
6.2    Limitations 
The inclusion of more than two cases would create a more robust study that would support 
stronger analytical generalization.  However, time constraints and limited case selection made the 
addition of other cases a challenge.   
A second limitation is asymmetric information from the case studies.  FONAFIFO built 
their web site to include statistics and other data that are sought by researchers and organizational 
structure includes staff to respond to a public enquiry.  In addition, a majority of the existing 
literature on PES includes Costa Rica.  On the other, Fundación Natura as a small non-profit, has 
much less resources and lesser research information is available on the Los Negros RWA. 
Thirdly, it was challenging to analyze transaction costs, particularly opportunity costs, 
qualitatively.  In this case, opportunity cost was included in the cost-effectiveness outcome.  From 
a qualitative analysis perspective, the determination of opportunity costs appropriateness could be 
made from using literature indicating a threshold of what is considered to be low payment or high 
payment. However, opportunity cost is based on the value of a forgone activity replaced with PES.  
The true determination of whether the opportunity costs being paid is cost effective would be first 
analyzed against the value of the forgone activity and compared with literature on opportunity 
costs.  However, data was not available to conduct the needed analysis. 
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6.3    Opportunities for further studies  
There are further areas of research that can be explored to expand on this thesis area, for example: 
1.  Analysis of the User-financed and Government-financed PES programs in a Developed country 
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Appendix A: Types of payment for ecosystem services (adapted from Payment for ecosystem 
services: Getting Started, A Primer, Forest Trends, The Katoomba Group, and UNEP, 2008) 
 
Types of PES Description 
Public payment 
programs for private 
land owners 
These types of PES agreements are country-specific, where 
Governments have established focused programs (as in Mexico and 
Costa Rica). While specifics vary by program focus and country, they 
commonly involve direct payments from a Government agency, or 
another public institution, to landowners and/or managers. 
Formal markets with 
open 
trading between 
buyers and sellers, 
either: 
(1) under a 
regulatory cap 
or floor on the level of 
ecosystem services to 





These payment for ecosystem services programs are established through 
legislation that creates demand for a particular ecosystem service by 
setting a ‘cap’ on the damage to, or investment focused on, an ecosystem 
service. The Users of the service, or at least the people who are 
responsible for diminishing that service respond either by complying 
directly or by trading with others who are able to meet the regulation at 
lower cost. Buyers are defined by the legislation, but are usually private-
sector companies or other institutions. Sellers may also be companies or 
there entities that the legislation allows to be sellers and who are going 
beyond regulatory requirements. 
 
Voluntary markets also exist, as in the case of most carbon emission 
trading in the United States. For example, companies or organizations 
seeking to reduce their carbon footprints are motivated to engage in the 
voluntary market to enhance their brands, to anticipate emerging 
regulation, in response to stakeholder and/or shareholder pressure, or 
other motivations. Voluntary exchanges are also a category of private 
payments (see below). 
Self-organized 
private deals 
in which individual 
beneficiaries 
of ecosystem services 
contract 
directly with providers 
of those 
services 
Voluntary markets, as outlined above, are a category of private 
payments for ecosystem services. 
 
Other private PES deals also exist in contexts where there are no formal 
regulatory markets (or none are anticipated in the near term) and where 
there is little (if any) Government involvement. In these instances, 
buyers of ecosystem services may be private companies or 
conservationists who pay landowners to change management practices 
in order to improve the quality of the services on which the buyer wishes 
to maintain or is dependent. The motivations for engaging in these 
transactions can be as diverse as the buyers, as is explored further in the 
step-by-step section that follows on finding buyers. 
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Appendix B:  Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
You are being invited to participate in a research study conducted by Tanya Williams-Daley for a 
Master’s Thesis through the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT).  The thesis research is on 
Environmental Effectiveness, Cost Efficiency and Equity in User-managed and Government-
managed schemes using Programa Face de Forestación (PROFAFOR) as a case study.  I ask that 
you read this form before agreeing to be in the research. 
About the Study 
As the administrator of  Programa Face de Forestación (PROFAFOR), the institution/organization 
plays a key role in the design of the PES scheme and is directly involved in its implementation.   It 
is in this vein that I would like to discuss with you, as an authorized representative of PROFAFOR-
FACE, the key features of the payment for ecosystem scheme. While some of the information 
being requested has been found in past research, I am gathering additional information to ensure 
that the information presented in my thesis is as up to date as possible.     
 
Procedures 
If you agree to be in this study, I will conduct an interview with you.  A questionnaire will be sent 
to you prior to the interview.  I can arrange a Skype call or an alternate media more convenient to 
you where I would conduct the interview with you using the questions on the questionnaire.  The 
areas of interest include: (1) the scope of the PES scheme, including the number of participants 
and acreage under the scheme, how participants are chosen, including if there is a pro-poor variable 
in participants selection (2) the methods of payment in the scheme, how the scheme is funded and, 
(3)how the scheme is monitored and how additionality is measured. The data collected will be 
used to compare against best practices for Payment for Ecosystem Services using the variables of 
environmental effectiveness, cost efficiency and equity/fairness. 
The interview will take about 30 minutes to complete. With your permission, I would also like to 
do an audio recording of the interview.   
Risks and Benefits 
I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in the 
provision of general information on the scheme.  There are no benefits to you, but the 
recommendations from the thesis may be helpful to PROFAFOR-FACE. 
 
Confidentiality 
The information received from you will be cited to PROFAFOR-FACE.  I will not include any 
information that will make it possible to identify you.  
 
Voluntary Participation 
Your participation is voluntary.   By participating in the study, you are indicating that you have 
read and understood the information provided above and that you are willingly participating in the 
study.  Please note that you may withdraw your consent at any time. 
Contact 
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Please feel free to contact me at tanyamrlawilliams@gmail.com or 001-(512)963-2805  if you have 
any further questions. If there are any questions or concerns about your rights or if there is any 
concern about how the research is being conducted, please contact Ms. Heather Foti, MPH 
Associate Director at email: hmfsrs@rit.edu, at telephone 001-(585)475-7673 or via mail at 
Human Subjects Research Office (HSRO)University Services Center, Suite 240014, 1 Lomb 






Appendix C:  Questionnaire (Translated in Spanish as well) 
 
I am currently completing a Master of Science Degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy 
from the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT).  My thesis research is on Environmental 
Effectiveness, Cost Efficiency and Equity/Fairness in User-managed and Government-managed 
schemes using Costa Rica National Payment for Environmental Services Program as a case study. 
 
As the administrator of the Costa Rica National Payment for Environmental Services Program, the 
institution/organization plays a key role in the design of the PES scheme and is directly involved 
in its implementation.   It is in this vein that I would like to discuss with you key features of the 
payment for ecosystem scheme managed by FONAFIFO. While some of the information being 
requested has been found in past research, I am gathering additional information to ensure that the 
information presented in my thesis is as up to date as possible.     
 
The data collected will be used to compare against best practices for Payment for Ecosystem 
Services using the variables of environmental effectiveness, cost efficiency and equity/fairness. 
 
I would appreciate if you could take a few minutes to answer the questionnaire that you will find 
attached. The questionnaire has been approved by RIT’s Office of Human Subjects Research as 
being in accordance with the institution’s research guidelines.   Any information collected will be 
attributed to FONAFIFO and not to any person(s). 
 
To complete the questionnaire, I can arrange a Skype call or an alternate media more convenient 
to you where I would conduct an interview with you.  Prior to the call  the questionnaire would 
be sent to you.  The interview will take 30 minutes to complete. 
 
Please feel free to contact me at tanyamrlawilliams@gmail.com if you have any questions.  If there 
are any questions or concerns about your rights or if there is any concern about how this research 
is being conducted, please contact Ms. Heather Foti, MPH Associate Director at email: 
hmfsrs@rit.edu, at telephone 001-(585)475-7673 or via mail at Human Subjects Research Office 





MSc Candidate, Science Technology and Policy 
Rochester Institute of Technology 








1. When was the PES scheme established?  
 
2. What is the institutional and policy framework for PES? 
 
3. Was the PES established to replace any legislation?  
a. Yes. If yes, please answer questions 4 and 5 
b. No 
 
4. Which legislation or policy did PES replace? 
 
5. What was the purpose of the legislation or policy which PES replaced? 
 
6. How was the process of designing the PES approached, i.e, was there collaboration 
outside of administrative body? 
 
7. What is the financing mechanism for the PES scheme? 
 
8. Is there a financial sustainability plan for the PES scheme? 
 
II. Scope, Monitoring and Conditionality 
 
1. What is the acreage size of the PES scheme?  
i. Original acreage  __________ 
ii. Current acreage _____________ 
 
2. What is the acreage size enrolled under contract?  
 
3. How many participants/number of contracts are in the PES? 
i. Original Number _________ 
ii. Current number __________ 
iii. Projected Number _________ 
 
 




Participants in Payment for Ecosystem Services Scheme 
Types of Participants Number of Participants 
Individual Landowners  
Private Entity  
Groups   
 
5. What ecosystem service (s) are being targeted? Are these services provided as single 
units or bundled? 
 
6. Was a baseline established for the areas covered in the scheme?   
a. Yes. When was the baseline established (year) _____ 
b. No 
 
7. How is the scheme monitored? 
 
8. Are participants given payments based on: 
a. Proxy actions, e.g. hectares of forest not cleared, reforestation, etc.   
b. Actual provision of the targeted ecosystem services 
c. Other (please explain) ____________________________________ 
 
III. Eligibility and Participation 
  
1. Are there intermediaries involved in the PES? 
a. Yes.  Please identify the type of intermediaries 
i) NGOs  ii) investors  iii) community groups iv) other ________________  
b. No 
 
2.  Is there a contractual agreement for participants?  
a. Yes.  If yes, please answer questions 3 - 5. 
b. No 
 
3. What is the period of the contract? Do all participants get the same contract? 
 
4. How is the contract renewed? 
a. Based on provision of service(s)/compliance 
b. Based on automatic renewal 
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c. Other (please explain) ________________________ 
 
5. How is the contract enforced?  
 
6. What is the rate of compliance with PES contract? 
 
7. Are participants required to have formal land titles to participate in the PES scheme? 
a. Yes  b. No 
 
8. Have any indigenous groups with communal or non-traditional land ownership applied to 
participate in the PES scheme? If yes, what is the rate of participation? 
 
9. What variables are used to select participants applying to participate in the scheme?  
Please circle all that applies. 
  a.  eligibility based on land size. Indicate set land size range ________________ 
            b.  proximity to ecosystem service (s) being protected, etc.?   c. Opportunity costs 
d. Other 
 
10. Was the issue of equity/fairness included in the selection of participants?  
 
 
III. Payment and Financing Structure 
1. Is the PES scheme based on a valuation study for ecosystems services? 
a.  Yes.  What was value of ecosystems services in the PES? _____________ 
b. No 
 
2. Are payments differentiated or standard across the contracts?  If differentiated, on what 
basis are payments made? 
 
3. How are participants paid/incentivized for participating in the PES scheme?  Please circle 
all that applies and add any additional information? 
a.  Cash     b. in kind   c. training/capacity building  d. extension services  
      e. Other (please explain) _______________  
 
4.  How is the PES scheme financed? 
